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Ideas for 'works', 'Why Reason Can't be Naturalized' and 'A Structural Account of Mathematics'

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3 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Archimedes defined a straight line as the shortest distance between two points [Archimedes, by Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Archimedes gave a sort of definition of 'straight line' when he said it is the shortest line between two points.
     From: report of Archimedes (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Gottfried Leibniz - New Essays on Human Understanding 4.13
     A reaction: Commentators observe that this reduces the purity of the original Euclidean axioms, because it involves distance and measurement, which are absent from the purest geometry.
Analytic geometry gave space a mathematical structure, which could then have axioms [Chihara]
     Full Idea: With the invention of analytic geometry (by Fermat and then Descartes) physical space could be represented as having a mathematical structure, which could eventually lead to its axiomatization (by Hilbert).
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 02.3)
     A reaction: The idea that space might have axioms seems to be pythagoreanism run riot. I wonder if there is some flaw at the heart of Einstein's General Theory because of this?
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
We can replace existence of sets with possibility of constructing token sentences [Chihara, by MacBride]
     Full Idea: Chihara's 'constructability theory' is nominalist - mathematics is reducible to a simple theory of types. Instead of talk of sets {x:x is F}, we talk of open sentences Fx defining them. Existence claims become constructability of sentence tokens.
     From: report of Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004]) by Fraser MacBride - Review of Chihara's 'Structural Acc of Maths' p.81
     A reaction: This seems to be approaching the problem in a Fregean way, by giving an account of the semantics. Chihara is trying to evade the Quinean idea that assertion is ontological commitment. But has Chihara retreated too far? How does he assert existence?