display all the ideas for this combination of texts
27 ideas
560 | Mathematical precision is only possible in immaterial things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We should not see mathematical exactitude in all things, but only for things that do not have matter. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0995a14) |
9076 | Mathematics studies the domain of perceptible entities, but its subject-matter is not perceptible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Mathematics does not take perceptible entities as its domain just because its subject-matter is accidentally perceptible; but neither does it take as its domain some other entities separable from the perceptible ones. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1078a03) | |
A reaction: This implies a very naturalistic view of mathematics, with his very empiricist account of abstraction deriving the mathematical concepts within the process of perceiving the physical world. And quite right too. |
8739 | Geometry studies the Euclidean space that dictates how we perceive things [Kant, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: For Kant, geometry studies the forms of perception in the sense that it describes the infinite space that conditions perceived objects. This Euclidean space provides the forms of perception, or, in Kantian terms, the a priori form of empirical intuition. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 4.2 | |
A reaction: We shouldn't assume that the discovery of new geometries nullifies this view. We evolved in small areas of space, where it is pretty much Euclidean. We don't perceive the curvature of space. |
8740 | Geometry would just be an idle game without its connection to our intuition [Kant] |
Full Idea: Were it not for the connection to intuition, geometry would have no objective validity whatever, but be mere play by the imagination or the understanding. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B298/A239), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 4.2 | |
A reaction: If we pursue the idealist reading of Kant (in which the noumenon is hopelessly inapprehensible), then mathematics still has not real application, despite connection to intuition. However, Kant would have been an intuitionist, and not a formalist. |
16899 | Geometrical truth comes from a general schema abstracted from a particular object [Kant, by Burge] |
Full Idea: Kant explains the general validity of geometrical truths by maintaining that the particularity is genuine and ineliminable but is used as a schema. One abstracts from the particular elements of the objects of intuition in forming a general object. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B741/A713) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority (with ps) 4 | |
A reaction: A helpful summary by Burge of a rather wordy but very interesting section of Kant. I like the idea of being 'abstracted', but am not sure why that must be from one particular instance [certainty?]. The essence of triangles emerges from comparisons. |
10958 | Perhaps numbers are substances? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: We should consider whether there is some other sort of substance, such as, perhaps, numbers. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1037a11) | |
A reaction: I don't think Aristotle considers numbers to be substances, but Pythagoreans seem to think that way, if they think the world is literally made of numbers. |
13273 | Pluralities divide into discontinous countables; magnitudes divide into continuous things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A plurality is a denumerable quantity, and a magnitude is a measurable quantity. A plurality is what is potentially divisible into things that are not continuous, whereas what is said to be a magnitude is divisible into continuous things. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1020a09) | |
A reaction: This illuminating distinction is basic to the Greek attitude to number, and echoes the distinction between natural and real numbers. |
12074 | The one in number just is the particular [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It makes no difference whether we speak of the particular or the one in number. For by the one in number we mean the particular. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0999b33) | |
A reaction: This is the Greek view of 'one', quite different from the Frege or Dedekind view. I prefer the Greek view, because 'one' is the place where numbers plug into the world, and the one indispensable feature of numbers is that they can count particulars. |
17844 | The unit is stipulated to be indivisible [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The unit is stipulated to be indivisible in every respect. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052b35) |
17845 | If only rectilinear figures existed, then unity would be the triangle [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Suppose that all things that are ...were rectilinear figures - they would be a number of figures, and unity the triangle. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1054a03) | |
A reaction: This is how they program graphics for computer games, with profusions of triangles. The thought that geometry might be treated numerically is an obvious glimpse of Descartes' co-ordinate geometry. |
17859 | Units came about when the unequals were equalised [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The original holder of the theory claimed ...that units came about when the unequals were equalised. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1081a24) | |
A reaction: Presumably you could count the things that were already equal. You can count days and count raindrops. The genius is to see that you can add the days to the raindrops, by treating them as equal, in respect of number. |
17861 | Two men do not make one thing, as well as themselves [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A pair of men do not make some one thing in addition to themselves. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1082a18) | |
A reaction: This seems to contrast nicely with Frege's claim about whether two boots are two things or one pair. |
646 | When we count, are we adding, or naming numbers? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is a vexed question whether, when we count and say 'one, two, three…', we are doing so by addition or by separate modules. We are, of course, doing both. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1082b32) | |
A reaction: Note that this is almost Benacerraf's famous problem about whether or not 3 is a member of 4. |
9632 | Kant only accepts potential infinity, not actual infinity [Kant, by Brown,JR] |
Full Idea: For Kant the only legitimate infinity is the so-called potential infinity, not the actual infinity. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.5 | |
A reaction: This is part of what leads on the the Constructivist view of mathematics. There is a procedure for endlessly continuing, but no procedure for arriving. That seems to make good sense. |
3343 | Euclid's could be the only viable geometry, if rejection of the parallel line postulate doesn't lead to a contradiction [Benardete,JA on Kant] |
Full Idea: The possible denial of the parallel lines postulate does not entail that Kant was wrong in considering Euclid's the only viable geometry. If the denial issued in a contradiction, then the postulate would be analytic, and Kant would be refuted. | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.18 |
8737 | Kant suggested that arithmetic has no axioms [Kant, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Kant suggested that arithmetic has no axioms. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B204-6/A164) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 4.2 | |
A reaction: A hundred years later a queue was forming to spell out the axioms of arithmetic. The definitions of 0 and 1 always look to me more like logicians' tricks than profound truths. Some notions of successor and induction do, however, seem needed. |
5557 | Axioms ought to be synthetic a priori propositions [Kant] |
Full Idea: Concerning magnitude ...there are no axioms in the proper sense. ....Axioms ought to be synthetic a priori propositions. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B205/A164) | |
A reaction: This may be a hopeless dream, but it is (sort of) what all philosophers long for. Post-modern relativism may just be the claim that all axioms are analytic. Could a posteriori propositions every qualify as axioms? |
17843 | The idea of 'one' is the foundation of number [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: One is the principle of number qua number. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1052b21) |
17850 | Each many is just ones, and is measured by the one [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The reason for saying of each number that it is many is just that it is ones and that each number is measured by the one. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1056b16) |
17851 | Number is plurality measured by unity [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Number is plurality as measured by unity. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1057a04) |
9793 | Mathematics studies abstracted relations, commensurability and proportion [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Mathematicians abstract perceptible features to study quantity and continuity ...and examine the mutual relations of some and the features of those relations, and commensurabilities of others, and of yet others the proportions. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1061a32) | |
A reaction: This sounds very much like the intuition of structuralism to me - that the subject is entirely about relations between things, with very little interest in the things themselves. See Aristotle on abstraction (under 'Thought'). |
13738 | It is a simple truth that the objects of mathematics have being, of some sort [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Since there are not only separable things but also inseparable things (such as, for instance, things which are moving), it is also true to say simpliciter that the objects of mathematic have being and that they are of such a sort as is claimed. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1077b31) | |
A reaction: This is almost Aristotle's only discussion of whether mathematical entities exist. They seem to have an 'inseparable' existence (the way properties do), but he evidently regards a denial of their existence (Field-style) as daft. |
12339 | Aristotle removes ontology from mathematics, and replaces the true with the beautiful [Aristotle, by Badiou] |
Full Idea: For Aristotle, the de-ontologization of mathematics draws the beautiful into the place of the true. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE]) by Alain Badiou - Briefings on Existence 14 |
12421 | Kant's intuitions struggle to judge relevance, impossibility and exactness [Kitcher on Kant] |
Full Idea: Kant's intuitions have the Irrelevance problem (which structures of the mind are just accidental?), the Practical Impossibility problem (how to show impossible-in-principle?), and the Exactness problem (are entities exactly as they seem?). | |
From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 03.1 | |
A reaction: [see Kitcher for an examination of these] Presumably the answer to all three must be that we have meta-intuitions about our intuitions, or else intuitions come with built-in criteria to deal with the three problems. We must intuit something specific. |
17617 | Maths is a priori, but without its relation to empirical objects it is meaningless [Kant] |
Full Idea: Although all these principles .....are generated in the mind completely a priori, they would still not signify anything at all if we could not always exhibit their significance in appearances (empirical objects). | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B299/A240) | |
A reaction: This is the subtle Kantian move that we all have to take seriously when we try to assert 'realism' about anything. Our drive for meaning creates our world for us? |
12458 | Kant taught that mathematics is independent of logic, and cannot be grounded in it [Kant, by Hilbert] |
Full Idea: Kant taught - and it is an integral part of his doctrine - that mathematics treats a subject matter which is given independently of logic. Mathematics, therefore, can never be grounded solely in logic. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by David Hilbert - On the Infinite p.192 | |
A reaction: Presumably Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems endorse the Kantian view, that arithmetic is sui generis, and beyond logic. |
2795 | If 7+5=12 is analytic, then an infinity of other ways to reach 12 have to be analytic [Kant, by Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Kant claimed that 7+5=12 is synthetic a priori. If the concept of 12 analytically involves knowing 7+5, it also involves an infinity of other arithmetical ways to reach 12, which is inadmissible. | |
From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B205/A164) by Jonathan Dancy - Intro to Contemporary Epistemology 14.3 |