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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'W.V. Quine' and 'The Scope and Language of Science'

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3 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein]
     Full Idea: The 'natural' numbers are the whole numbers 1, 2, 3 and so on. The 'rational' numbers consist of the natural numbers plus the fractions. The 'real' numbers include the others, plus numbers such a pi and root-2, which cannot be expressed as fractions.
     From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.2)
     A reaction: The 'irrational' numbers involved entities such as root-minus-1. Philosophical discussions in ontology tend to focus on the existence of the real numbers.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Maths can be reduced to logic and set theory [Quine]
     Full Idea: Researches in the foundations of mathematics have made it clear that all of (interpreted) mathematics can be got down to logic and set theory, and the objects needed for mathematics can be got down to the category of classes (and classes of classes..).
     From: Willard Quine (The Scope and Language of Science [1954], §VI)
     A reaction: This I take to be a retreat from pure logicism, presumably influenced by Gödel. So can set theory be reduced to logic? Crispin Wright is the one the study.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein]
     Full Idea: The question to be posed is whether is-a-member-of should be considered a logical constant, that is, does logic include set theory. Frege, Russell and Whitehead held that it did.
     From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This is obviously the key element in the logicist programme. The objection seems to be that while first-order logic is consistent and complete, set theory is not at all like that, and so is part of a different world.