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2 ideas
17823 | If mathematical objects exist, how can we know them, and which objects are they? [Maddy] |
Full Idea: The popular challenges to platonism in philosophy of mathematics are epistemological (how are we able to interact with these objects in appropriate ways) and ontological (if numbers are sets, which sets are they). | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Sets and Numbers [1981], I) | |
A reaction: These objections refer to Benacerraf's two famous papers - 1965 for the ontology, and 1973 for the epistemology. Though he relied too much on causal accounts of knowledge in 1973, I'm with him all the way. |
17829 | Number words are unusual as adjectives; we don't say 'is five', and numbers always come first [Maddy] |
Full Idea: Number words are not like normal adjectives. For example, number words don't occur in 'is (are)...' contexts except artificially, and they must appear before all other adjectives, and so on. | |
From: Penelope Maddy (Sets and Numbers [1981], IV) | |
A reaction: [She is citing Benacerraf's arguments] |