display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
23626 | Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack] |
Full Idea: The transfinite ordinal numbers are important in the theory of proofs, and essential in the theory of recursive functions and computability. Mathematics would be incomplete without them. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], 10.1) | |
A reaction: Hossack offers this as proof that the numbers are not human conceptual creations, but must exist beyond the range of our intellects. Hm. |
9949 | There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: For Frege, the extension of the concept F is an object, as revealed by the fact that we use a name to refer to it. ..We must distinguish the concept, the object that falls under it, and the extension of the concept, which is the set containing the object. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (On Concept and Object [1892]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.2 | |
A reaction: This I take to be the key distinction needed if one is to grasp Frege's account of what a number is. When we say that Frege is a platonist about numbers, it is because he is committed to the notion that the extension is an object. |
23621 | Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack] |
Full Idea: I propose that numbers are properties, not sets. Magnitudes are a kind of property, and numbers are magnitudes. …Natural numbers are properties of pluralities, positive reals of continua, and ordinals of series. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], Intro) | |
A reaction: Interesting! Since time can have a magnitude (three weeks) just as liquids can (three litres), it is not clear that there is a single natural property we can label 'magnitude'. Anything we can manage to measure has a magnitude. |
23622 | We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack] |
Full Idea: Numbers cannot be mental objects constructed by our own minds: there exists at most a potential infinity of mental constructions, whereas the axioms of mathematics require an actual infinity of numbers. | |
From: Keith Hossack (Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number [2020], Intro 2) | |
A reaction: Doubt this, but don't know enough to refute it. Actual infinities were a fairly late addition to maths, I think. I would think treating fictional complete infinities as real would be sufficient for the job. Like journeys which include imagined roads. |