17441
|
Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck]
|
|
Full Idea:
Wright is claiming that HP is a special sort of truth in some way: it is supposed to be the fundamental truth about cardinality; ...in particular, HP is supposed to be more fundamental, in some sense than the Dedekind-Peano axioms.
|
|
From:
report of Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 1
|
|
A reaction:
Heck notes that although PA can be proved from HP, HP can be proven from PA plus definitions, so direction of proof won't show fundamentality. He adds that Wright thinks HP is 'more illuminating'.
|
13862
|
There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C]
|
|
Full Idea:
Informally, Peano's axioms are: 0 is a number, numbers have a successor, different numbers have different successors, 0 isn't a successor, properties of 0 which carry over to successors are properties of all numbers.
|
|
From:
Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], Intro)
|
|
A reaction:
Each statement of the famous axioms is slightly different from the others, and I have reworded Wright to fit him in. Since the last one (the 'induction axiom') is about properties, it invites formalization in second-order logic.
|
10140
|
We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
|
|
Full Idea:
Wright says the Fregean arithmetic can be broken down into two steps: first, Hume's Law may be derived from Law V; and then, arithmetic may be derived from Hume's Law without any help from Law V.
|
|
From:
report of Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983]) by Kit Fine - The Limits of Abstraction I.4
|
|
A reaction:
This sounds odd if Law V is false, but presumably Hume's Law ends up as free-standing. It seems doubtful whether the resulting theory would count as logic.
|
8692
|
Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend]
|
|
Full Idea:
Wright proposed removing Frege's basic law V (which led to paradox), replacing it with Frege's 'number principle' (identity of numbers is one-to-one correspondence). The new system is formally consistent, and the Peano axioms can be derived from it.
|
|
From:
report of Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.7
|
|
A reaction:
The 'number principle' is also called 'Hume's principle'. This idea of Wright's resurrected the project of logicism. The jury is ought again... Frege himself questioned whether the number principle was a part of logic, which would be bad for 'logicism'.
|
17440
|
Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck]
|
|
Full Idea:
Wright intends the claim that Hume's Principle (HP) embodies an explanation of the concept of number to imply that it is analytic of the concept of cardinal number - so it is an analytic or conceptual truth, much as a definition would be.
|
|
From:
report of Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 1
|
|
A reaction:
Boolos is quoted as disagreeing. Wright is claiming a fundamental truth. Boolos says something can fix the character of something (as yellow fixes bananas), but that doesn't make it 'fundamental'. I want to defend 'fundamental'.
|