display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
18281 | In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning; even when it doesn't look like that because we seem to be using words to talk about mathematical things. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Grammar [1932], p.468), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 13 'Constr' | |
A reaction: I would have thought that an algorithm needs some raw material to work with. This leads to the idea that meaning arises from rules of usage. |
8466 | For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Quine, by Orenstein] |
Full Idea: Quine feels that the intuitionist's ontology of abstract objects is too slight to serve the needs of classical mathematics. | |
From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3 | |
A reaction: Quine, who devoted his life to the application of Ockham's Razor, decided that sets were an essential part of the ontological baggage (which made him, according to Orenstein, a 'reluctant Platonist'). Dummett defends intuitionism. |
8467 | Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
Full Idea: Intuitionists will not admit any numbers which are not properly constructed out of rational numbers, ...but classical mathematics appeals to the real numbers (a non-denumerable totality) in notions such as that of a limit | |
From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3 | |
A reaction: (See Idea 8454 for the categories of numbers). This is a problem for Dummett. |