display all the ideas for this combination of texts
20 ideas
18141 | Nominalism about mathematics is either reductionist, or fictionalist [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Nominalism has two main versions, one which tries to 'reduce' the objects of mathematics to something simpler (Russell and Wittgenstein), and another which claims that such objects are mere 'fictions' which have no reality (Field). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9) |
18157 | Nominalism as based on application of numbers is no good, because there are too many applications [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The style of nominalism which aims to reduce statements about numbers to statements about their applications does not work for the natural numbers, because they have many applications, and it is arbitrary to choose just one of them. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.B.5.iii) |
18150 | Actual measurement could never require the precision of the real numbers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: We all know that in practice no physical measurement can be 100 per cent accurate, and so it cannot require the existence of a genuinely irrational number, rather than some of the rational numbers close to it. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.3) |
18158 | Ordinals are mainly used adjectively, as in 'the first', 'the second'... [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The basic use of the ordinal numbers is their use as ordinal adjectives, in phrases such as 'the first', 'the second' and so on. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.5.iii) | |
A reaction: That is because ordinals seem to attach to particulars, whereas cardinals seem to attach to groups. Then you say 'three is greater than four', it is not clear which type you are talking about. |
18127 | Simple type theory has 'levels', but ramified type theory has 'orders' [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The simple theory of types distinguishes sets into different 'levels', but this is quite different from the distinction into 'orders' which is imposed by the ramified theory. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.1) | |
A reaction: The ramified theory has both levels and orders (p.235). Russell's terminology is, apparently, inconsistent. |
18144 | Neo-logicists agree that HP introduces number, but also claim that it suffices for the job [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The neo-logicists take up Frege's claim that Hume's Principle introduces a new concept (of a number), but unlike Frege they go on to claim that it by itself gives a complete account of that concept. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.2) | |
A reaction: So the big difference between Frege and neo-logicists is the Julius Caesar problem. |
18147 | Neo-logicists meet the Caesar problem by saying Hume's Principle is unique to number [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The response of neo-logicists to the Julius Caesar problem is to strengthen Hume's Principle in the hope of ensuring that only numbers will satisfy it. They say the criterion of identity provided by HP is essential to number, and not to anything else. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.2) |
18129 | Many crucial logicist definitions are in fact impredicative [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Many of the crucial definitions in the logicist programme are in fact impredicative. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.2) |
18111 | Treating numbers as objects doesn't seem like logic, since arithmetic fixes their totality [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If logic is neutral on the number of objects there are, then logicists can't construe numbers as objects, for arithmetic is certainly not neutral on the number of numbers there are. They must be treated in some other way, perhaps as numerical quantifiers. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 5.5) |
18146 | If Hume's Principle is the whole story, that implies structuralism [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If Hume's Principle is all we are given, by way of explanation of what the numbers are, the only conclusion to draw would seem to be the structuralists' conclusion, ...studying all systems that satisfy that principle. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.2) | |
A reaction: Any approach that implies a set of matching interpretations will always imply structuralism. To avoid it, you need to pin the target down uniquely. |
18159 | Higher cardinalities in sets are just fairy stories [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In its higher reaches, which posit sets of huge cardinalities, set theory is just a fairy story. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.5.iii) | |
A reaction: You can't say the higher reaches are fairy stories but the lower reaches aren't, if the higher is directly derived from the lower. The empty set and the singleton are fairy stories too. Bostock says the axiom of infinity triggers the fairy stories. |
18155 | A fairy tale may give predictions, but only a true theory can give explanations [Bostock] |
Full Idea: A common view is that although a fairy tale may provide very useful predictions, it cannot provide explanations for why things happen as they do. In order to do that a theory must also be true (or, at least, an approximation to the truth). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.B.5) | |
A reaction: Of course, fictionalism offers an explanation of mathematics as a whole, but not of the details (except as the implications of the initial fictional assumptions). |
18140 | The best version of conceptualism is predicativism [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In my personal opinion, predicativism is the best version of conceptualism that we have yet discovered. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.4) | |
A reaction: Since conceptualism is a major player in the field, this makes predicativism a very important view. I won't vote Predicativist quite yet, but I'm tempted. |
18138 | Conceptualism fails to grasp mathematical properties, infinity, and objective truth values [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Three simple objections to conceptualism in mathematics are that we do not ascribe mathematical properties to our ideas, that our ideas are presumably finite, and we don't think mathematics lacks truthvalue before we thought of it. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.4) | |
A reaction: [compressed; Bostock refers back to his Ch 2] Plus Idea 18134. On the whole I sympathise with conceptualism, so I will not allow myself to be impressed by any of these objections. (So, what's actually wrong with them.....?). |
18131 | If abstracta only exist if they are expressible, there can only be denumerably many of them [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If an abstract object exists only when there is some suitable way of expressing it, then there are at most denumerably many abstract objects. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Fine by me. What an odd view, to think there are uncountably many abstract objects in existence, only a countable portion of which will ever be expressed! [ah! most people agree with me, p.243-4] |
18132 | The predicativity restriction makes a difference with the real numbers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: It is with the real numbers that the restrictions imposed by predicativity begin to make a real difference. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3) |
18133 | The usual definitions of identity and of natural numbers are impredicative [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The predicative approach cannot accept either the usual definition of identity or the usual definition of the natural numbers, for both of these definitions are impredicative. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3) | |
A reaction: [Bostock 237-8 gives details] |
18134 | Predicativism makes theories of huge cardinals impossible [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Classical mathematicians say predicative mathematics omits areas of great interest, all concerning non-denumerable real numbers, such as claims about huge cardinals. There cannot be a predicative version of this theory. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that anyone will really miss huge cardinals if they are prohibited, though cryptography seems to flirt with such things. Are we ever allowed to say that some entity conjured up by mathematicians is actually impossible? |
18136 | If we can only think of what we can describe, predicativism may be implied [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If we accept the initial idea that we can think only of what we ourselves can describe, then something like the theory of predicativism quite naturally results | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3) | |
A reaction: I hate the idea that we can only talk of what falls under a sortal, but 'what we can describe' is much more plausible. Whether or not you agree with this approach (I'm pondering it), this makes predicativism important. |
18135 | If mathematics rests on science, predicativism may be the best approach [Bostock] |
Full Idea: It has been claimed that only predicative mathematics has a justification through its usefulness to science (an empiricist approach). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed. Quine is the obvious candidate] I suppose predicativism gives your theory roots, whereas impredicativism is playing an abstract game. |