Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Of the original contract' and 'Must We Believe in Set Theory?'

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3 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos]
     Full Idea: The existence of infinitely many natural numbers seems to me no more troubling than that of infinitely many computer programs or sentences of English. There is, for example, no longest sentence, since any number of 'very's can be inserted.
     From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.129)
     A reaction: If you really resisted an infinity of natural numbers, presumably you would also resist an actual infinity of 'very's. The fact that it is unclear what could ever stop a process doesn't guarantee that the process is actually endless.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / f. Uncountable infinities
Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos]
     Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge nothing in mathematics or science requires the existence of very high orders of infinity.
     From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.122)
     A reaction: He is referring to particular high orders of infinity implied by set theory. Personally I want to wield Ockham's Razor. Is being implied by set theory a sufficient reason to accept such outrageous entities into our ontology?
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos]
     Full Idea: It is no surprise that we should be able to reason mathematically about many of the things we experience, for they are already 'abstract'.
     From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.129)
     A reaction: He has just given a list of exemplary abstract objects (Idea 10489), but I think there is a more interesting idea here - that our experience of actual physical objects is to some extent abstract, as soon as it is conceptualised.