16150
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One is, so numbers exist, so endless numbers exist, and each one must partake of being [Plato]
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Full Idea:
If one is, there must also necessarily be number - Necessarily - But if there is number, there would be many, and an unlimited multitude of beings. ..So if all partakes of being, each part of number would also partake of it.
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From:
Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 144a)
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A reaction:
This seems to commit to numbers having being, then to too many numbers, and hence to too much being - but without backing down and wondering whether numbers had being after all. Aristotle disagreed.
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21555
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For 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one range of individuals (or 'type') higher than x [Russell]
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Full Idea:
In his 1903 theory of types he distinguished between individuals, ranges of individuals, ranges of ranges of individuals, and so on. Each level was a type, and it was stipulated that for 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one type higher than x.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], App)
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A reaction:
Russell was dissatisfied because this theory could not deal with Cantor's Paradox. Is this the first time in modern philosophy that someone has offered a criterion for whether a proposition is 'meaningful'?
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18003
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In 'x is a u', x and u must be of different types, so 'x is an x' is generally meaningless [Russell, by Magidor]
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Full Idea:
Russell argues that in a statement of the form 'x is a u' (and correspondingly, 'x is a not-u'), 'x must be of different types', and hence that ''x is an x' must in general be meaningless'.
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From:
report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], App B:524) by Ofra Magidor - Category Mistakes 1.2
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A reaction:
" 'Word' is a word " comes to mind, but this would be the sort of ascent to a metalanguage (to distinguish the types) which Tarski exploited. It is the simple point that a classification can't be the same as a member of the classification.
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