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Ideas for 'Isagoge ('Introduction')', 'Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals' and 'Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws)'

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5 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege]
     Full Idea: If 'number' is the referent of a numerical symbol, a real number is the same as a ratio of quantities. ...A length can have to another length the same ratio as a mass to another mass.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893], III.1.73), quoted by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics 21 'Frege's'
     A reaction: This is part of a critique of Cantor and the Cauchy series approach. Interesting that Frege, who is in the platonist camp, is keen to connect the real numbers with natural phenomena. He is always keen to keep touch with the application of mathematics.
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege]
     Full Idea: It cannot be demanded that everything be proved, because that is impossible; but we can require that all propositions used without proof be expressly declared as such, so that we can see distinctly what the whole structure rests upon.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893], p.2), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 7 'What'
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright]
     Full Idea: Frege opts for his famous definition of numbers in terms of extensions of the concept 'equal to the concept F', but he then (in 'Grundgesetze') needs a theory of extensions or classes, which he provided by means of Basic Law V.
     From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893]) by B Hale / C Wright - Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' §1
Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege]
     Full Idea: Cantor pointed out explicitly to Frege that it is a mistake to take the notion of a set (i.e. of that which has a cardinal number) to simply mean the extension of a concept. ...Frege's later assumption of this was an act of recklessness.
     From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893]) by William W. Tait - Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind III
     A reaction: ['recklessness' is on p.61] Tait has no sympathy with the image of Frege as an intellectual martyr. Frege had insufficient respect for a great genius. Cantor, crucially, understood infinity much better than Frege.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege]
     Full Idea: I hold that my Basic Law V is a law of pure logic.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893], p.4), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.1
     A reaction: This is, of course, the notorious law which fell foul of Russell's Paradox. It is said to be pure logic, even though it refers to things that are F and things that are G.