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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Reference and Generality (3rd ed)' and 'Counting and the Natural Numbers'

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4 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
The essence of natural numbers must reflect all the functions they perform [Sicha]
     Full Idea: What is really essential to being a natural number is what is common to the natural numbers in all the functions they perform.
     From: Jeffrey H. Sicha (Counting and the Natural Numbers [1968], 2)
     A reaction: I could try using natural numbers as insults. 'You despicable seven!' 'How dare you!' I actually agree. The question about functions is always 'what is it about this thing that enables it to perform this function'.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
To know how many, you need a numerical quantifier, as well as equinumerosity [Sicha]
     Full Idea: A knowledge of 'how many' cannot be inferred from the equinumerosity of two collections; a numerical quantifier statement is needed.
     From: Jeffrey H. Sicha (Counting and the Natural Numbers [1968], 3)
Counting puts an initial segment of a serial ordering 1-1 with some other entities [Sicha]
     Full Idea: Counting is the activity of putting an initial segment of a serially ordered string in 1-1 correspondence with some other collection of entities.
     From: Jeffrey H. Sicha (Counting and the Natural Numbers [1968], 2)
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry]
     Full Idea: If we list the words 'bull', 'bull' and 'cow', it is often said that there are three 'word tokens' but only two 'word types', but Geach says there are not two kinds of object to be counted, but two different ways of counting the same object.
     From: report of Peter Geach (Reference and Generality (3rd ed) [1980]) by John Perry - The Same F II
     A reaction: Insofar as the notion that a 'word type' is an 'object', my sympathies are entirely with Geach, to my surprise. Geach's point is that 'bull' and 'bull' are the same meaning, but different actual words. Identity is relative to a concept.