8763
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The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro]
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Full Idea:
It is surely wise to identify the positions in the natural numbers structure with their counterparts in the integer, rational, real and complex number structures.
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From:
Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.2)
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A reaction:
The point is that this might be denied, since 3, 3/1, 3.00.., and -3*i^2 are all arrived at by different methods of construction. Natural 3 has a predecessor, but real 3 doesn't. I agree, intuitively, with Shapiro. Russell (1919) disagreed.
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10164
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Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price]
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Full Idea:
A common formulation of Peano Arithmetic uses 2nd-order logic, the constant '1', and a one-place function 's' ('successor'). Three axioms then give '1 is not a successor', 'different numbers have different successors', and induction.
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From:
E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2)
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A reaction:
This is 'second-order' Peano Arithmetic, though it is at least as common to formulate in first-order terms (only quantifying over objects, not over properties - as is done here in the induction axiom). I like the use of '1' as basic instead of '0'!
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8762
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Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro]
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Full Idea:
Zermelo said that for each number n, its successor is the singleton of n, so 3 is {{{null}}}, and 1 is not a member of 3. Von Neumann said each number n is the set of numbers less than n, so 3 is {null,{null},{null,{null}}}, and 1 is a member of 3.
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From:
Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 10.2)
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A reaction:
See Idea 645 - Zermelo could save Plato from the criticisms of Aristotle! These two accounts are cited by opponents of the set-theoretical account of numbers, because it seems impossible to arbitrate between them.
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10167
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Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price]
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Full Idea:
Structuralism has emerged from the development of abstract algebra (such as group theory), the creation of axiom systems, the introduction of set theory, and Bourbaki's encyclopaedic survey of set theoretic structures.
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From:
E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §2)
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A reaction:
In other words, mathematics has gradually risen from one level of abstraction to the next, so that mathematical entities like points and numbers receive less and less attention, with relationships becoming more prominent.
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10169
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Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price]
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Full Idea:
Relativist Structuralism simply picks one particular model of axiomatised arithmetic (i.e. one particular interpretation that satisfies the axioms), and then stipulates what the elements, functions and quantifiers refer to.
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From:
E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §4)
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A reaction:
The point is that a successful model can be offered, and it doesn't matter which one, like having any sort of aeroplane, as long as it flies. I don't find this approach congenial, though having a model is good. What is the essence of flight?
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10179
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There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price]
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Full Idea:
The term 'structure' has two uses in the literature, what can be called 'particular structures' (which are particular relational systems), but also what can be called 'universal structures' - what particular systems share, or what they instantiate.
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From:
E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §6)
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A reaction:
This is a very helpful distinction, because it clarifies why (rather to my surprise) some structuralists turn out to be platonists in a new guise. Personal my interest in structuralism has been anti-platonist from the start.
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10182
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There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price]
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Full Idea:
There are four main variants of structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics - formalist structuralism, relativist structuralism, universalist structuralism (with modal variants), and pattern structuralism.
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From:
E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §9)
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A reaction:
I'm not sure where Chihara's later book fits into this, though it is at the nominalist end of the spectrum. Shapiro and Resnik do patterns (the latter more loosely); Hellman does modal universalism; Quine does the relativist version. Dedekind?
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10168
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Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price]
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Full Idea:
Formalist Structuralism endorses structural methodology in mathematics, but rejects semantic and metaphysical problems as either meaningless, or purely formal, or as inference relations.
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From:
E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §3)
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A reaction:
[very compressed] I find the third option fairly congenial, certainly in preference to rather platonist accounts of structuralism. One still needs to distinguish the mathematical from the non-mathematical in the inference relations.
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10178
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Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price]
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Full Idea:
It is tempting to take a modal turn, and quantify over all possible objects, because if there are only a finite number of actual objects, then there are no models (of the right sort) for Peano Arithmetic, and arithmetic is vacuously true.
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From:
E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5)
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A reaction:
[compressed; Geoffrey Hellman is the chief champion of this view] The article asks whether we are not still left with the puzzle of whether infinitely many objects are possible, instead of existent.
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10177
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Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price]
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Full Idea:
Universalist Structuralism is eliminativist about abstract objects, in a distinctive form. Instead of treating the base element (say '1') as an ambiguous referring expression (the Relativist approach), it is a variable which is quantified out.
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From:
E Reck / M Price (Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths [2000], §5)
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A reaction:
I am a temperamental eliminativist on this front (and most others) so this is tempting. I am also in love with the concept of a 'variable', which I take to be utterly fundamental to all conceptual thought, even in animals, and not just a trick of algebra.
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8749
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Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro]
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Full Idea:
Term Formalism is the view that mathematics is just about characters or symbols - the systems of numerals and other linguistic forms. ...This will cover integers and rational numbers, but what are real numbers supposed to be, if they lack names?
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From:
Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 6.1.1)
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A reaction:
Real numbers (such as pi and root-2) have infinite decimal expansions, so we can start naming those. We could also start giving names like 'Harry' to other reals, though it might take a while. OK, I give up.
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8750
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Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro]
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Full Idea:
Game Formalism likens mathematics to chess, where the 'content' of mathematics is exhausted by the rules of operating with its language. ...This, however, leaves the problem of why the mathematical games are so useful to the sciences.
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From:
Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 6.1.2)
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A reaction:
This thought pushes us towards structuralism. It could still be a game, but one we learned from observing nature, which plays its own games. Chess is, after all, modelled on warfare.
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8753
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Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro]
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Full Idea:
Critics commonly complain that the intuitionist restrictions cripple the mathematician. On the other hand, intuitionist mathematics allows for many potentially important distinctions not available in classical mathematics, and is often more subtle.
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From:
Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 7.1)
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A reaction:
The main way in which it cripples is its restriction on talk of infinity ('Cantor's heaven'), which was resented by Hilbert. Since high-level infinities are interesting, it would be odd if we were not allowed to discuss them.
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8731
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Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro]
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Full Idea:
I classify conceptualists according to what they say about properties or concepts. If someone classified properties as existing independent of language I would classify her as a realist in ontology of mathematics. Or they may be idealists or nominalists.
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From:
Stewart Shapiro (Thinking About Mathematics [2000], 2.2.1)
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A reaction:
In other words, Shapiro wants to eliminate 'conceptualist' as a useful label in philosophy of mathematics. He's probably right. All thought involves concepts, but that doesn't produce a conceptualist theory of, say, football.
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