display all the ideas for this combination of texts
12 ideas
12334 | There is no single unified definition of number [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Apparently - and this is quite unlike old Greek times - there is no single unified definition of number. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 11) |
12335 | Numbers are for measuring and for calculating (and the two must be consistent) [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Number is an instance of measuring (distinguishing the more from the less, and calibrating data), ..and a figure for calculating (one counts with numbers), ..and it ought to be a figure of consistency (the compatibility of order and calculation). | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 11) |
12333 | Each type of number has its own characteristic procedure of introduction [Badiou] |
Full Idea: There is a heterogeneity of introductory procedures of different classical number types: axiomatic for natural numbers, structural for ordinals, algebraic for negative and rational numbers, topological for reals, mainly geometric for complex numbers. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 11) |
12322 | Must we accept numbers as existing when they no longer consist of units? [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Do we have to confer existence on numbers whose principle is to no longer consist of units? | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 2) | |
A reaction: This very nicely expresses what seems to me perhaps the most important question in the philosophy of mathematics. I am reluctant to accept such 'unitless' numbers, but I then feel hopelessly old-fashioned and naïve. What to do? |
12327 | The undecidability of the Continuum Hypothesis may have ruined or fragmented set theory [Badiou] |
Full Idea: As we have known since Paul Cohen's theorem, the Continuum Hypothesis is intrinsically undecidable. Many believe Cohen's discovery has driven the set-theoretic project into ruin, or 'pluralized' what was once presented as a unified construct. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 6) | |
A reaction: Badiou thinks the theorem completes set theory, by (roughly) finalising its map. |
16321 | The compactness theorem can prove nonstandard models of PA [Halbach] |
Full Idea: Nonstandard models of Peano arithmetic are models of PA that are not isomorphic to the standard model. Their existence can be established with the compactness theorem or the adequacy theorem of first-order logic. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 8.3) |
16343 | The global reflection principle seems to express the soundness of Peano Arithmetic [Halbach] |
Full Idea: The global reflection principle ∀x(Sent(x) ∧ Bew[PA](x) → Tx) …seems to be the full statement of the soundness claim for Peano arithmetic, as it expresses that all theorems of Peano arithmetic are true. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 22.1) | |
A reaction: That is, an extra principle must be introduced to express the soundness. PA is, of course, not complete. |
16312 | To reduce PA to ZF, we represent the non-negative integers with von Neumann ordinals [Halbach] |
Full Idea: For the reduction of Peano Arithmetic to ZF set theory, usually the set of finite von Neumann ordinals is used to represent the non-negative integers. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 6) | |
A reaction: Halbach makes it clear that this is just one mode of reduction, relative interpretability. |
12329 | If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it [Badiou] |
Full Idea: If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it (as they are for the Platonist). | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 7) | |
A reaction: See also Idea 12328. I file this to connect it with Hellman's modal (and nominalist) version of structuralism. Could it be that mathematics and modal logic are identical? |
12328 | Platonists like axioms and decisions, Aristotelians like definitions, possibilities and logic [Badiou] |
Full Idea: A Platonist's interest focuses on axioms in which the decision of thought is played out, where an Aristotelian or Leibnizian interest focuses on definitions laying out the representation of possibilities (...and the essence of mathematics is logic). | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 7) | |
A reaction: See Idea 12323 for the significance of the Platonist approach. So logicism is an Aristotelian project? Frege is not a true platonist? I like the notion of 'the representation of possibilities', so will vote for the Aristotelians, against Badiou. |
16308 | Set theory was liberated early from types, and recent truth-theories are exploring type-free [Halbach] |
Full Idea: While set theory was liberated much earlier from type restrictions, interest in type-free theories of truth only developed more recently. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 4) | |
A reaction: Tarski's theory of truth involves types (or hierarchies). |
12331 | Logic is definitional, but real mathematics is axiomatic [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Logic is definitional, whereas real mathematics is axiomatic. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 10) |