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Ideas for 'Thinking About Mathematics', 'On Formally Undecidable Propositions' and 'Laches'

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23 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
10132 There can be no single consistent theory from which all mathematical truths can be derived [Gödel, by George/Velleman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
8763 The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
18249 Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
8764 Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
3198 Gödel showed that arithmetic is either incomplete or inconsistent [Gödel, by Rey]
10072 First Incompleteness: arithmetic must always be incomplete [Gödel, by Smith,P]
9590 Arithmetical truth cannot be fully and formally derived from axioms and inference rules [Gödel, by Nagel/Newman]
11069 Gödel's Second says that semantic consequence outruns provability [Gödel, by Hanna]
10118 First Incompleteness: a decent consistent system is syntactically incomplete [Gödel, by George/Velleman]
10122 Second Incompleteness: a decent consistent system can't prove its own consistency [Gödel, by George/Velleman]
10611 There is a sentence which a theory can show is true iff it is unprovable [Gödel, by Smith,P]
10867 'This system can't prove this statement' makes it unprovable either way [Gödel, by Clegg]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / f. Zermelo numbers
8762 Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
8760 Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro]
8761 A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
8744 Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
8749 Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro]
8750 Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro]
8752 Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
8753 Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
8731 Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
8747 Realists are happy with impredicative definitions, which describe entities in terms of other existing entities [Gödel, by Shapiro]
8730 'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro]