Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Phenomenalism', 'Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals' and 'Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence'

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2 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo]
     Full Idea: We can give an exhaustive account of the identity of the empty set and its singleton without mentioning infinite sets, and it might be possible to defend the view that one natural number depends on its predecessor but not vice versa.
     From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], V)
     A reaction: Linnebo uses this as one argument against mathematical structuralism, where the small seems to depend on the large. The view of sets rests on the iterative conception, where each level is derived from a lower level. He dismisses structuralism of sets.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn]
     Full Idea: In order that we have available an explanation of the qualities of objects we need to be able to conceive primary qualities as consisting in something other than powers to produce experiences.
     From: Colin McGinn (Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals [1983], 6 n 52)
     A reaction: I suppose if the qualities are nothing more than the source of the experiences, that is Kant's noumenon. Nothing more could be said. The seems to be a requirement for tacit inference here. We infer the interior of the tomato.