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3 ideas
17443 | Many of us find Frege's claim that truths depend on one another an obscure idea [Heck on Frege] |
Full Idea: Frege sometimes speaks of 'the dependence of truths upon one another' (1884:§2), but I find such ideas obscure, and suspect I'm not the only one who does. | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §02) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 1 | |
A reaction: He refers to Burge 'struggling mightily' with this aspect of Frege's thought. I intend to defend Frege. See his 1914 lectures. I thought this dependence was basic to the whole modern project of doing metaphysics through logic? |
17445 | Parallelism is intuitive, so it is more fundamental than sameness of direction [Frege, by Heck] |
Full Idea: Frege says that parallelism is more fundamental than sameness of direction because all geometrical notions must originally be given in intuition. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §64) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 3 | |
A reaction: If Frege thinks some truths are more fundamental, this gives an indication of his reasons. But intuition is not a very strong base. |
10539 | Frege refers to 'concrete' objects, but they are no different in principle from abstract ones [Frege, by Dummett] |
Full Idea: Frege employs the notion of 'concrete' (wirklich, literally 'actual') objects, in arguing that not every object is concrete, but it does not work; abstract objects are just as much objects as concrete ones. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §26,85) by Michael Dummett - Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) Ch.14 | |
A reaction: See Idea 10516 for why Dummett is keen on the distinction. Frege strikes me as being wildly irresponsible about ontology. |