display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
10279 | Can we discover whether a deck is fifty-two cards, or a person is time-slices or molecules? [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Can we 'discover' whether a deck is really identical with its fifty-two cards, or whether a person is identical with her corresponding time-slices, molecules, or space-time points? This is like Benacerraf's problem about numbers. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Philosophy of Mathematics [1997]) | |
A reaction: Shapiro is defending the structuralist view, that each of these is a model of an agreed reality, so we cannot choose a right model if they all satisfy the necessary criteria. |
10227 | The abstract/concrete boundary now seems blurred, and would need a defence [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: The epistemic proposals of ontological realists in mathematics (such as Maddy and Resnik) has resulted in the blurring of the abstract/concrete boundary. ...Perhaps the burden is now on defenders of the boundary. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Philosophy of Mathematics [1997], 4.1) | |
A reaction: As Shapiro says, 'a vague boundary is still a boundary', so we need not be mesmerised by borderline cases. I would defend the boundary, with the concrete just being physical. A chair is physical, but our concept of a chair may already be abstract. |
10226 | Mathematicians regard arithmetic as concrete, and group theory as abstract [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Mathematicians use the 'abstract/concrete' label differently, with arithmetic being 'concrete' because it is a single structure (up to isomorphism), while group theory is considered more 'abstract'. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Philosophy of Mathematics [1997], 4.1 n1) | |
A reaction: I would say that it is the normal distinction, but they have moved the significant boundary up several levels in the hierarchy of abstraction. |
10262 | Fictionalism eschews the abstract, but it still needs the possible (without model theory) [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Fictionalism takes an epistemology of the concrete to be more promising than concrete-and-abstract, but fictionalism requires an epistemology of the actual and possible, secured without the benefits of model theory. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Philosophy of Mathematics [1997], 7.2) | |
A reaction: The idea that possibilities (logical, natural and metaphysical) should be understood as features of the concrete world has always struck me as appealing, so I have (unlike Shapiro) no intuitive problems with this proposal. |
10277 | Structuralism blurs the distinction between mathematical and ordinary objects [Shapiro] |
Full Idea: One result of the structuralist perspective is a healthy blurring of the distinction between mathematical and ordinary objects. ..'According to the structuralist, physical configurations often instantiate mathematical patterns'. | |
From: Stewart Shapiro (Philosophy of Mathematics [1997], 8.4) | |
A reaction: [The quotation is from Penelope Maddy 1988 p.28] This is probably the main reason why I found structuralism interesting, and began to investigate it. |