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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Varieties of Ontological Dependence' and 'The Tarskian Turn'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki]
     Full Idea: The relata of the grounding relation are typically taken to be facts or propositions, while the relata of ontological dependence ...are objects and their characteristics, activities, constituents and so on.
     From: Kathrin Koslicki (Varieties of Ontological Dependence [2012], 7.5 n25)
     A reaction: Interesting. Good riddance to propositions here, but this seems a bit unfair to facts, since I take facts to be in the world. Audi's concept of 'worldly facts' is what we need here.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten]
     Full Idea: While positive and perhaps even negative atomic facts may be unproblematic, it seems excessive to commit oneself to the existence of logically complex facts such as disjunctive facts.
     From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.1)
     A reaction: Presumably it is hard to deny that very complex statements involving massive disjunctions can be true or false. But why does commitment to real facts have to involve a huge ontology? The ontology is just the ingredients of the fact, isn't it?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten]
     Full Idea: If 'Britain is large' and 'Italy is large' lack truth values, then so must 'Britain or Italy is large' - so on the supervaluationist account the truth value of a disjunction is not determined by the truth values of its disjuncts.
     From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 06.2)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 15362 to get the full picture here.
If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten]
     Full Idea: If 'Italy is a large country' lacks a truth value, then so too, presumably, does 'Italy is not a large country'. But 'Italy is or is not a large country' is true, on the supervaluationist account, because it is a truth of classical propositional logic.
     From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 06.2)
     A reaction: See also Idea 15363. He cites Fine 1975.