Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Metaphysics', 'Introduction to 'Modality'' and 'Physics'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The sophists assume that being Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum is different from being Coriscus-in-the-marketplace.
     From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 219b19)
     A reaction: This is what has now been called 'Cambridge change', which is merely change in relations, with no intrinsic change. It is laughed at, but it is a phenomenon worth pointing out, as long as it is not mislabelled, or misunderstood.
Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Change is the actuality of that which exists potentially, in so far as it is potentially this actuality. Thus, the actuality of a thing's capacity for alteration, in so far as it is a capacity for alteration, is alteration.
     From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 201a10)
     A reaction: Not very informative, until you add Idea 16114, telling us that potentiality is best seen as 'power'. Then we have 'all change is the active expression of powers', which strikes me as rather interesting.
Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Nature [phusis] is in the same genus as dunamis [power/potential], for it is an active principle of change, but not in another thing but in the thing itself qua itself.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1049a09)
     A reaction: [Gill's translation; Lawson-Tancred refers to 'A nature' rather than 'nature', which implies an essence]. It seems like phusis is intrinsic, and dunamis is relational. Two sorts of power?
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
An actuality is usually thought to be a process [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: An actuality is thought most normally to be a process.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1047a30)
     A reaction: He comments of this that he wishes to include entelechies (unified items) in the general account, and not just processes. To present everything as fundamentally a process is a hard story to tell with full coherence, I think.