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Ideas for 'Topics', 'Issues of Pragmaticism' and 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism'

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10 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
21708 Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B]
     Full Idea: Russell's new logical atomist ontology was of particulars, universals and facts, replacing the ontology of 'platonic atomism' consisting just of propositions.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 1
     A reaction: Linsky cites Peter Hylton as saying that the earlier view was never replaced. The earlier view required propositions to be 'unified'. I surmise that the formula 'Fa' combines a universal and a particular, to form an atomic fact. [...but Idea 6111!]
19051 Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine]
     Full Idea: In 1918 Russell does not admit facts as fundamental; atomic facts are atomic as facts go, but they are compound objects. The atoms of Russell's logical atomism are not atomic facts but sense data.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Willard Quine - Russell's Ontological Development p.83
     A reaction: By about 1921 Russell had totally given up sense-data, because he had been reading behaviourist psychology.
6089 Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell]
     Full Idea: I call my doctrine logical atomism because, as the last residue of analysis, I wish to arrive at logical atoms and not physical atoms; some of them will be particulars, and others will be predicates and relations and so on.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §I)
     A reaction: However we judge it, logical atomism is a vital landmark in the history of 'analytical' philosophy, because it lays out the ideal for our assessment. It is fashionable to denigrate analysis, but I think it is simply the nearest to wisdom we will ever get.
6100 Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell]
     Full Idea: When you have enumerated all the atomic facts in the world, it is a further fact about the world that those are all the atomic facts there are about the world.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §V)
     A reaction: There is obviously a potential regress of facts about facts here. This looks like one of the reasons why the original logical atomism had a short shelf-life. Personally I see this as an argument in favour of rationalism, in the way Bonjour argues for it.
6105 Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell]
     Full Idea: Logical atomism is the view that you can get down in theory, if not in practice, to ultimate simples, out of which the world is built, and that those simples have a kind of reality not belonging to anything else.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VIII)
     A reaction: This dream is to empiricists what the Absolute is to rationalists - a bit silly, but an embodiment of the motivating dream.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
21709 You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell]
     Full Idea: Facts are the sort of things that are asserted or denied by propositions, and are not properly entities at all in the same sense in which their constituents are. That is shown by the fact that you cannot name them.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], p.235), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 2.2
     A reaction: [ref to Papers vol.8] It is customary to specify a proposition by its capacity for T and F. So is a fact just 'a truth'? This contains the Fregean idea that things are only real if they can be picked out. I think of facts as independent of minds.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
18376 Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Russell argues for atomic facts, and also for existential facts, negative facts and general facts.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by David M. Armstrong - Truth and Truthmakers 05.1
     A reaction: Armstrong says he overdoes it. I would even add disjunctive facts, which Russell rejects. 'Rain or snow will ruin the cricket match'. Rain can make that true, but it is a disjunctive fact about the match.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
5465 Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis]
     Full Idea: Russell and Wittgenstein sought to reduce everything to singular facts or states of affairs, and Armstrong and Keith Campbell have more recently advocated ontologies of tropes or elementary states of affairs.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.3 n 11
     A reaction: A very interesting historical link. Logical atomism strikes me as a key landmark in the history of philosophy, and not an eccentric cul-de-sac. It is always worth trying to get your ontology down to minimal small units, to see what happens.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
6060 'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell]
     Full Idea: When you take any propositional function and assert of it that it is possible, that it is sometimes true, that gives you the fundamental meaning of 'existence'.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]), quoted by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.2
     A reaction: Functions depend on variables, so this leads to Quine's slogan "to be is to be the value of a variable". Assertions of non-existence are an obvious problem, but Russell thought of all that. All of this makes existence too dependent on language.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
12267 There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The four main types of predicates fall into ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity.
     From: Aristotle (Topics [c.331 BCE], 103b20)
     A reaction: These are the standard ten categories of Aristotle. He is notable for the divisions not being sharp, and ten being a rough total. He is well aware of the limits of precision in such matters.