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3 ideas
| 12095 | Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Knowledge is a double thing, being both potential and actual. It is universal and indefinite and it is the potentiality of something that is universal and indefinite. But actuality is definite and of something definite, being the this-such of a this-such. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1087a12) | |
| A reaction: Charlotte Witt identifies this as a key idea in 'Metaphysics', since the metaphysics is built on the epistemology, and this idea justifies the claim that Aristotle gives priority to particulars. I thoroughly approve. Not all knowledge is of the universal. |
| 11256 | Materialists cannot explain change [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle's main objection against the materialists (such as Thales and Anaximenes) is that they cannot explain why things change as they do. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0988b23-) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4 |
| 19494 | Fictionalism allows that simulated beliefs may be tracking real facts [Yablo] |
| Full Idea: The fictionalist offers the option that your simulated beliefs and assertions may be tracking a realm of genuine facts, or a realm of what you take to be facts. | |
| From: Stephen Yablo (Go Figure: a Path through Fictionalism [2001], 13) | |
| A reaction: This means that fictionalism does not have to be an error theory. That is, we aren't mistakenly believing something that we actually made up. Instead we are sensibly believing something we know to be not literally true. Love it. |