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3 ideas
| 22427 | To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn] |
| Full Idea: In order that we have available an explanation of the qualities of objects we need to be able to conceive primary qualities as consisting in something other than powers to produce experiences. | |
| From: Colin McGinn (Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals [1983], 6 n 52) | |
| A reaction: I suppose if the qualities are nothing more than the source of the experiences, that is Kant's noumenon. Nothing more could be said. The seems to be a requirement for tacit inference here. We infer the interior of the tomato. |
| 12095 | Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Knowledge is a double thing, being both potential and actual. It is universal and indefinite and it is the potentiality of something that is universal and indefinite. But actuality is definite and of something definite, being the this-such of a this-such. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1087a12) | |
| A reaction: Charlotte Witt identifies this as a key idea in 'Metaphysics', since the metaphysics is built on the epistemology, and this idea justifies the claim that Aristotle gives priority to particulars. I thoroughly approve. Not all knowledge is of the universal. |
| 11256 | Materialists cannot explain change [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle's main objection against the materialists (such as Thales and Anaximenes) is that they cannot explain why things change as they do. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0988b23-) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4 |