Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'fragments/reports' and 'Briefings on Existence'

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11 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
There is no Being as a whole, because there is no set of all sets [Badiou]
     Full Idea: The fundamental theorem that 'there does not exist a set of all sets' designates the inexistence of Being as a whole. ...A crucial consequence of this property is that any ontological investigation is irremediably local.
     From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 14)
     A reaction: The second thought pushes Badiou into Topos Theory, where the real numbers (for example) have a separate theory in each 'topos'.
True Being only occurs when it is completely full, with atoms and no void [Democritus, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: In response to defenders of the One, Democritus says that what is, in the proper sense, is being that is completely full, but that such a being is not one, but that they are unlimited in number and invisible because of the smallness of their masses.
     From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A007) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 325a28
     A reaction: Democritus is in a tangle here. He says proper being has no void, having apparently conceded that motion needs void (which he admits is non-existent). So true being only occurs when everything grinds to a halt, which is not now. But Idea 20902.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
Existence is Being itself, but only as our thought decides it [Badiou]
     Full Idea: Existence is precisely Being itself in as much as thought decides it. And that decision orients thought essentially. ...It is when you decide upon what exists that you bind your thought to Being.
     From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 2)
     A reaction: [2nd half p.57] Helpful for us non-Heideggerians to see what is going on. Does this mean that Being is Kant's noumenon?
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Being does not exist more than non-being [Democritus, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: They say that being does not exist more than non-being, because neither does the void exist more than the body.
     From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A006) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 0985b09
     A reaction: The claim that Being and Non-Being are the same thing is pretty startling. It seems to be an expedient to get Void into the picture, even though it is taken to be wholly devoid of qualities.
The non-existent exists as much as the existent, because it has causal powers [Democritus]
     Full Idea: What exists does not exist at all more than what does not exist, and both are causes in a similar way for the things that come about.
     From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A008), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' p.28.4-27
     A reaction: [Simplicius actually attributes this to the shadowy Leucippus] You can see the point. If you drive into a pothole, that has considerable causal powers.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The only distinctions are Configuration (shape), Disposition (order) and Turning (position) [Democritus, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: They say that what is differs only by Configuration ([rhusmos], which is the shape), by Disposition ([diathege], which is the order), and by Turning ([tropê], which is the position.
     From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A006) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 0985b16
     A reaction: If you give the shape, structure and position of an object, there is no much more to say. Perhaps mention time.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
The modern view of Being comes when we reject numbers as merely successions of One [Badiou]
     Full Idea: The saturation and collapse of the Euclidean idea of the being of number as One's procession signs the entry of the thought of Being into modern times.
     From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 11)
     A reaction: That is, by allowing that not all numbers are built of units, numbers expand widely enough to embrace everything we think of as Being. The landmark event is the acceptance of the infinite as a number.
The primitive name of Being is the empty set; in a sense, only the empty set 'is' [Badiou]
     Full Idea: In Set Theory, the primitive name of Being is the void, the empty set. The whole hierarchy takes root in it. In a certain sense, it alone 'is'.
     From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 6)
     A reaction: This is the key to Badiou's view that ontology is mathematics. David Lewis pursued interesting enquiries in this area.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Nothing comes from non-existence, or passes into it [Democritus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Nothing comes into being from what does not exist, nor is it destroyed into what does not exist.
     From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A001) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.44
     A reaction: [part of a concise summary of Democritus by DL] Probably an intuition about conservation laws, rather than a speculation about the Big Bang.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Ontology is (and always has been) Cantorian mathematics [Badiou]
     Full Idea: Enlightened by the Cantorian grounding of mathematics, we can assert ontology to be nothing other than mathematics itself. This has been the case ever since its Greek origin.
     From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 1)
     A reaction: There seems to be quite a strong feeling among mathematicians that new 'realms of being' are emerging from their researches. Only a Platonist, of course, is likely to find this idea sympathetic.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
It is not possible to know what sort each thing is [Democritus]
     Full Idea: In reality [eteé] to recognise what sort each thing is, belongs to what is impracticable [aporos].
     From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B008), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.137
     A reaction: On the whole modern scientists (and the rest of us) shoehorn virtually everything into a specific category. It strikes me as wildly bad metaphysics to say that everything necessarily has its category.