display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
8314 | Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Philosophers who invoke facts are divided over whether facts are wholly abstract entities or are complexes capable of containing concrete objects as constituents. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.2) | |
A reaction: If externalism about concepts was true (see Thought|Content|Broad Content), this would support the second (more concrete) view of facts. The correspondence theory of truth would love to plug belief into the concrete world. Me too. |
8316 | Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe] |
Full Idea: There is a difficulty for any view of facts which sees them as being wholly abstract entities, and yet also being causal relata; for it seems that only concrete entities, existing in time and space, can enter into causal relations. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.3) | |
A reaction: There seems a lot of ambiguity in the air here, between epistemology and ontology (surprise!). I take causation to be a physical activity in the concrete world. Our understanding of it is expressed with abstractions. 'Fact' seems to have two meanings. |
8318 | The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe] |
Full Idea:
The most notorious problem besetting the view that facts are structured complexes of constituents is the question of what it is that binds the supposed constituents into the fact. The ordered triple |
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From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.5) | |
A reaction: Lowe denies that facts are complex entities on this basis. You only have the problem if Mars and its redness are two 'things'. If redness is intrinsically a dependent item, we may escape. I wish they wouldn't use colours as examples. See Idea 5456. |
8323 | It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Although 'fact' is grammatically a count noun, it strikes us as being at best whimsical to talk about enumerating facts - to talk, for instance, about how many facts I learned today before breakfast. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 12.4) | |
A reaction: I always liked the question 'how many facts are there in this room?' One might make a serious attempt to decide how many facts I learned before breakfast, and reach a reasonable approximation, especially if one didn't open the newspaper. |
8313 | Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Facts seem to be indispensable as truth-makers and perhaps as causal relata, ..but if we must only include in our ontology things for which we can state a criterion of identity (Quine), ..we seem to be faced with a dilemma. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11) | |
A reaction: Lowe proposes to relax the identification requirement (see Idea 8312). This seems a good strategy. An awful lot of strange philosophy arises from insisting on strict conditions for our understanding, and then finding everywhere failure to achieve it. |
21598 | Austin revealed many meanings for 'vague': rough, ambiguous, general, incomplete... [Austin,JL, by Williamson] |
Full Idea: Austin's account brought out the variety of features covered by 'vague' in different contexts: roughness, ambiguity, imprecision, lack of detail, generality, inaccuracy, incompleteness. Even 'vague' is vague. | |
From: report of J.L. Austin (Sense and Sensibilia [1962], p.125-8) by Timothy Williamson - Vagueness 3.1 | |
A reaction: Some of these sound the same. Maybe Austin distinguishes them. |
8258 | Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe] |
Full Idea: One of the chief rivals to my own substance-based ontology is the view that holds facts or states of affairs to be the building-blocks of the world. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], Pref) | |
A reaction: I think I side with Lowe, even though I am uneasy about the gap between the philosopher's 'substance' and the basic entities of physics. Facts are hard to individuate, and seem to be composed of more basic elements. |
8301 | Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Some abstract objects, notably certain universals, need to be invoked for explanatory purposes, even if it cannot be said that they themselves possess causal powers or enter into causal relations. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.2) | |
A reaction: I am unconvinced that an entity with no causal powers could be any kind of explanation, given that, by definition, it can't do anything. You would have to think that the world of pure reason functioned without the aid of causal powers. |