display all the ideas for this combination of texts
27 ideas
568 | Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Some things are called things that are because they are substances, other things are called things that are because they are affections of a substance. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1003b07) |
12348 | There are four kinds of being: incidental, per se, potential and actual, and being as truth [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Δ.7 Aristotle lists four kinds of being ('to on'): incidental being, per se being, potential and actual being, and being as truth. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1017a07-) by Michael V. Wedin - Aristotle's Theory of Substance III.1 | |
A reaction: These don't seem to be mutually exclusive, though the first two are, and potential and actual are. They look like three ways of getting at being. |
11194 | Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true [Aristotle, by Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Aristotle says there are two proper uses of the term 'being': firstly, for whatever falls into one of Aristotle's ten basic categories of thing, and secondly for whatever makes a proposition true. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1017a21-35) by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) p.91 | |
A reaction: The first sounds circular, because the categories must be selected for whatever has being (see Idea 11196). The first sounds Fregean, and very congenial to modern philosophy (though you need a clear notion of 'true'). Or it is being as truth-makers. |
11288 | Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The subject [to hupokeimenon, the underlying thing] is that of which other entities are said, it itself never being said-of anything else. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029b36) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the core or basis of being in 'Categories', which is rejected in favour of the more substantial (and determinate and explanatory) 'essence' in 'Metaphysics'. |
15776 | There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If the thing has being, it has it in a certain way and, if it does not have being in a certain way, it does not have being at all. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1051b34) | |
A reaction: I take this to be a key remark in ontology, and one that may not have been sufficiently heeded by Hegel and Heidegger. The only way to investigate being qua being is to investigate ways of being, which involves identity, categories etc. |
611 | Being, taken simply as being, is the domain of philosophy [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Being qua being, taken universally and not in regard to some part of it, is the domain of the science of philosophy. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1060b23) |
11232 | Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: For something to be a primary being ('proté ousia') is for it to be a being, something that is, simply in virtue of itself ('kath' hauto') and not in virtue of its relation to other things. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.3 |
11234 | The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle thinks there are three main candidates for primary being: the particular, the universal and the essence, and Aristotle will defend the third of these. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1028a33-6) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.4 | |
A reaction: If you really want to understand this idea, you must study this bit of the text carefully, and examine the translation of key terms like 'ousia'. Lawson-Tancred's translation gives a very different picture from Politis's commentary! |
11279 | Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle distinguishes three different answers to the question 'What is primary being?'; it is universals (which he thinks is Plato's answer); or it is the ultimate subject of predication (his answer in 'Categories'); or the essence (in 'Metaphysics'). | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1028b25-) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 4.4 | |
A reaction: I note that Michael Wedin argues that 'Metaphysics' is a development of 'Categories' rather than a change of view. The middle view has been unpacked nicely in modern discussions. The claim of essences needs more clarification. |
11293 | Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle argues that non-primary beings either do not have an essence at all, or they have an essence only in a derived way. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5 | |
A reaction: While I presume that Aristotle takes 'being' to be a univocal concept, he nevertheless divides it into 'primary' (or independent) and 'non-primary' (or dependent) being. His main subject of study is the primary version. |
11297 | Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: On any interpretation, Aristotle argues that primary being with regard to each thing is both the essence of that thing and the ultimate subject of predication with regard to that thing. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ousia) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5 | |
A reaction: This is Politis's prelude to an account of conflicting interpretations over whether 'ousia' has one or two meanings for Aristotle. |
566 | If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If there is nothing else besides individuals, how is it possible to have a science of infinity? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0999a25) |
16090 | Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
Full Idea: In 'Metaphysics' Aristotle argues that the various senses of being must be understood with reference to being in one primary sense, the being of substance. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1 Intro) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance | |
A reaction: This I take (with limited knowledge of such things) to be the key message that needs to be grasped by the followers of Hegel and Heidegger, who seem to think you can grasp Being either directly, or through human experience of it. |
570 | Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists' [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is plausible that one man and a man in existence and a man simpliciter are the same thing. Nothing is added by extending the expression to 'He is one man' and 'He is one man that is'. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1003b28) | |
A reaction: A suggestion of a redundancy theory of truth. |
12061 | The primary subject seems to be substance, to the fullest extent [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A strong case can be made for the claim that it is the primary subject (to hupokeimenon) that is substance (ousia) to the fullest extent. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1029a01) | |
A reaction: It seems to me that 'ousia' is best translated as 'being'. Aristotle eventually rejects the view in this idea, which is roughly the idea of that being is mainly the bare substratum. |
10946 | Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: That which is means a thing with thisness, a quantity or a quality. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1030b12) | |
A reaction: I'm happy with a 'quantity' to exist, either in countable or in non-countable form, but not totally convinced that we should treat 'qualities' as fully existing, given their dependence. |
16152 | Other types of being all depend on the being of substance [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The accounts of the other bearers of being depend on the account of substance. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1045b26) | |
A reaction: This is the distinctively Aristotelian approach to the problem of Being. |
11295 | There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Apparently Aristotle thinks that if something is not a determinate and well-defined thing ..then it is not a being at all. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], id) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics | |
A reaction: See Aristotle's account of 'matter', which seems to fit Politis's view. It is hard to go all the way with Aristotle on this, as indeterminate gunk (e.g. mud, which Plato so disliked!) seems to thoroughly exist. But for us it rests on determinate atoms. |
13735 | Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions [Aristotle, by Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: In Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' virtually no existence questions are posed, and the whole discussion is about substances (fundamental units of being). | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], id) by Jonathan Schaffer - On What Grounds What 1 | |
A reaction: This means that the basic metaphysical question is actually about identity, though Schaffer claims that it is about grounding. Why would we care about grounding? Aristotle cares most about what makes a thing the thing it is. |
16118 | Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Nature [phusis] is in the same genus as dunamis [power/potential], for it is an active principle of change, but not in another thing but in the thing itself qua itself. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1049a09) | |
A reaction: [Gill's translation; Lawson-Tancred refers to 'A nature' rather than 'nature', which implies an essence]. It seems like phusis is intrinsic, and dunamis is relational. Two sorts of power? |
15768 | An actuality is usually thought to be a process [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: An actuality is thought most normally to be a process. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1047a30) | |
A reaction: He comments of this that he wishes to include entelechies (unified items) in the general account, and not just processes. To present everything as fundamentally a process is a hard story to tell with full coherence, I think. |
17304 | As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: Grounding is something like metaphysical causation. Just as causation links the world across time, grounding links the world across levels. Grounding connects the more fundamental to the less fundamental, and thereby backs a certain form of explanation. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: Obviously you need 'levels' for this, which we should take to be structural levels. |
17306 | If ground is transitive and irreflexive, it has a strict partial ordering, giving structure [Schaffer,J] |
Full Idea: By treating grounding as transitive (and irreflexive), one generates a strict partial ordering that induces metaphysical structure. | |
From: Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], Intro) | |
A reaction: Schaffer's paper goes on to attach the claim that grounding is transitive, but I didn't find his examples very convincing. |
11154 | Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Prior things can have being without posterior things, without the posterior being able to have being without the prior, to adopt Plato's distinction. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1019a04) | |
A reaction: Fine quotes this, in expounding Aristotle's account of essence. |
12095 | Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Knowledge is a double thing, being both potential and actual. It is universal and indefinite and it is the potentiality of something that is universal and indefinite. But actuality is definite and of something definite, being the this-such of a this-such. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1087a12) | |
A reaction: Charlotte Witt identifies this as a key idea in 'Metaphysics', since the metaphysics is built on the epistemology, and this idea justifies the claim that Aristotle gives priority to particulars. I thoroughly approve. Not all knowledge is of the universal. |
11256 | Materialists cannot explain change [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: Aristotle's main objection against the materialists (such as Thales and Anaximenes) is that they cannot explain why things change as they do. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0988b23-) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4 |
12347 | The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, and there will be one science for each genus. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1004a04) | |
A reaction: This is robustly realist, and right at the heart of Aristotle's philosophy. It explains why essences and forms must be given through genera and differentiae, even though essences are individual. Genera are the only way to identify things. |