448
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No necessity could produce Being either later or earlier, so it must exist absolutely or not at all [Parmenides]
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Full Idea:
What necessity impelled Being, if it did spring from nothing, to be produced later or earlier? Thus it must be absolutely, or not at all.
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From:
Parmenides (fragments/reports [c.474 BCE], B08 ll.?), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 9.145.1-
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A reaction:
If there is a moment when Being is created, it is reasonable to ask why then, and not some other time? Obviously a conscious God can fill that gap,but that only defers the problem.
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447
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Being must be eternal and uncreated, and hence it is timeless [Parmenides]
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Full Idea:
Being has no coming-to-be and no destruction, for it is whole of limb, without motion, and without end. And it never was, nor will be, because it is now, a whole all together, one, continuous; for what creation of it will you look for?
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From:
Parmenides (fragments/reports [c.474 BCE], B08 ll.?), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 9.145.1-
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A reaction:
That being is eternal is a reasonable speculation, since its creation seems inconceivable. But why think it is without motion, when we see motion everywhere? That was Aristotle's reaction, too.
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445
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The realm of necessary non-existence cannot be explored, because it is unknowable [Parmenides]
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Full Idea:
The other way of enquiry, that IT IS NOT, and IT is bound NOT TO BE, cannot be explored, for you could neither recognise nor express that which IS NOT.
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From:
Parmenides (fragments/reports [c.474 BCE], B02), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 9.116.28-
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A reaction:
There is not much to say about that which is not, but quite a lot, I would have thought, about what is 'bound not to be'. What prevents it from being?
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