display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
| 12879 | Independent objects can exist apart, and maybe even entirely alone [Simons] |
| Full Idea: An object a is ontologically independent of b if a can exist without b, if there is a possible world in which in which a exists and b does not. In the strongest sense, an object is independent if it could be all there is. | |
| From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 8.4) | |
| A reaction: Simons calls the strongest version a 'startling' one which maybe not even God could achieve. |
| 11154 | Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Prior things can have being without posterior things, without the posterior being able to have being without the prior, to adopt Plato's distinction. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1019a04) | |
| A reaction: Fine quotes this, in expounding Aristotle's account of essence. |
| 12847 | Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons] |
| Full Idea: Syntactic criteria for mass nouns include that they admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. | |
| From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 4.6) | |
| A reaction: That is, they don't seem to be countable. Sortal terms are those which pick out countables. |
| 12863 | Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons] |
| Full Idea: Mass terms and plural terms differ principally in the indifference of mass terms to matters of division. A mass term can be used irrespective of how, indeed whether, the denotatum comes parcelled in units. | |
| From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 6.4) | |
| A reaction: It seems more to the point to say that mass terms (stuff) don't need units to exist, and you can disperse the units (the cups of water) without affecting the identity of the stuff. You can't pulverise a pile of stones and retain the stones. |
| 12862 | Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons] |
| Full Idea: The mass of gold cannot be identified with the gold atoms, because whatever is part of the gold atoms is gold, whereas not every part of the gold is gold (for example, the neutrons in it are not gold). | |
| From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 6.4) | |
| A reaction: There is something too quick about arguments like this. It comes back to nominal v real essence. We apply 'gold' to the superficial features of the stuff, but deep down we may actually mean the atomic structure. See Idea 12812. |
| 12858 | Mixtures disappear if nearly all of the mixture is one ingredient [Simons] |
| Full Idea: If a cupful of dirty water is mixed evenly with a ton of earth, no dirty water remains, and the same goes if we mix it evenly with a lake of clean water. | |
| From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 6.2) | |
| A reaction: This means that a mixture is a vague entity, subject to the sorites paradox. If the dirt was cyanide, we would consider the water to be polluted by it down to a much lower level. |
| 12859 | A mixture can have different qualities from its ingredients. [Simons] |
| Full Idea: The qualities of a mixture need not be those of its ingredients in isolation. | |
| From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 6.2) | |
| A reaction: It depends on what you mean by a quality. Presumably we can give a reductive account of the qualities of the mixture, as long as no reaction has taken place. The taste of a salad is just the sum of its parts. |