Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Metaphysics', 'Writing the Book of the World' and 'Universals'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Knowledge is a double thing, being both potential and actual. It is universal and indefinite and it is the potentiality of something that is universal and indefinite. But actuality is definite and of something definite, being the this-such of a this-such.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1087a12)
     A reaction: Charlotte Witt identifies this as a key idea in 'Metaphysics', since the metaphysics is built on the epistemology, and this idea justifies the claim that Aristotle gives priority to particulars. I thoroughly approve. Not all knowledge is of the universal.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Materialists cannot explain change [Aristotle, by Politis]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's main objection against the materialists (such as Thales and Anaximenes) is that they cannot explain why things change as they do.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0988b23-) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 2.4
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider]
     Full Idea: The truthmaker theorist's 'concrete' states of affairs must be distinguished from necessarily existing 'abstract' states of affairs.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.4)
     A reaction: [He cites Plantinga's 'Nature of Necessity' for the second one; I presume the first one is Armstrong]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider]
     Full Idea: We can add to the Quinean advice to believe the ontology of your best theory that you should also regard the ideology of your best theory as carving at the joints.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 02.3)
     A reaction: I've never liked the original Quinean formulation, but this is much better. I just take my ontological commitments to reside in me, not in whatever theory I am currently employing. I may be dubious about my own theory.