21708
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Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B]
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Full Idea:
Russell's new logical atomist ontology was of particulars, universals and facts, replacing the ontology of 'platonic atomism' consisting just of propositions.
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From:
report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 1
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A reaction:
Linsky cites Peter Hylton as saying that the earlier view was never replaced. The earlier view required propositions to be 'unified'. I surmise that the formula 'Fa' combines a universal and a particular, to form an atomic fact. [...but Idea 6111!]
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6089
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Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell]
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Full Idea:
I call my doctrine logical atomism because, as the last residue of analysis, I wish to arrive at logical atoms and not physical atoms; some of them will be particulars, and others will be predicates and relations and so on.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §I)
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A reaction:
However we judge it, logical atomism is a vital landmark in the history of 'analytical' philosophy, because it lays out the ideal for our assessment. It is fashionable to denigrate analysis, but I think it is simply the nearest to wisdom we will ever get.
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6105
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Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell]
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Full Idea:
Logical atomism is the view that you can get down in theory, if not in practice, to ultimate simples, out of which the world is built, and that those simples have a kind of reality not belonging to anything else.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VIII)
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A reaction:
This dream is to empiricists what the Absolute is to rationalists - a bit silly, but an embodiment of the motivating dream.
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18376
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Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong]
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Full Idea:
Russell argues for atomic facts, and also for existential facts, negative facts and general facts.
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From:
report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by David M. Armstrong - Truth and Truthmakers 05.1
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A reaction:
Armstrong says he overdoes it. I would even add disjunctive facts, which Russell rejects. 'Rain or snow will ruin the cricket match'. Rain can make that true, but it is a disjunctive fact about the match.
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5465
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Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis]
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Full Idea:
Russell and Wittgenstein sought to reduce everything to singular facts or states of affairs, and Armstrong and Keith Campbell have more recently advocated ontologies of tropes or elementary states of affairs.
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From:
report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.3 n 11
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A reaction:
A very interesting historical link. Logical atomism strikes me as a key landmark in the history of philosophy, and not an eccentric cul-de-sac. It is always worth trying to get your ontology down to minimal small units, to see what happens.
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