Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Issues of Pragmaticism', 'Logic in Mathematics' and 'Ordinary Objects'

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2 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
     Full Idea: Where there are analytic interrelations among our claims, distinct ontological claims may be true without rivalry, redundancy, or reduction.
     From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 10)
     A reaction: Thus we might, I suppose, that it is analytically necessary that a lump of clay has a shape, and that a statue be made of something. Interesting.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson]
     Full Idea: A theory does not avoid commitment to any entities by avoiding use of certain terms or concepts.
     From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 09.4)
     A reaction: This is a salutary warning to those who apply the notion of ontological commitment rather naively.