Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'Reference and Essence: seven appendices' and 'Criterion of Validity in Reasoning'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The fundamental hypothesis of the method of science is this: There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinion of them.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877]), quoted by Albert Atkin - Peirce 3 'method'
     A reaction: He admits later that this is only a commitment and not a fact. It seems to me that when you combine this idea with the huge success of science, the denial of realism is crazy. Philosophy has a lot to answer for.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Nobody can really doubt that there are Reals, for, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.19)
     A reaction: This rests on Peirce's view that all that really matters is a sense of genuine dissatisfaction, rather than a theoretical idea. So even at the end of Meditation One, Descartes isn't actually worried about whether his furniture exists.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce]
     Full Idea: Facts are hard things which do not consist in my thinking so and so, but stand unmoved by whatever you or I or any man or generations of men may opine about them.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Criterion of Validity in Reasoning [1903], I)
     A reaction: This is my view of facts, with which I am perfectly happy, for all the difficulties involved in individuating facts, and in disentangling them from our own modes of thought and expression. Let us try to establish the facts.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N]
     Full Idea: Insofar as identity seems vague, it is provably mistaken. If it is vague whether x and y are identical (as in the Ship of Theseus), then x,y is definitely not the same as x,x, since the first pair is indeterminate and the second pair isn't.
     From: Nathan Salmon (Reference and Essence: seven appendices [2005], App I)
     A reaction: [compressed; Gareth Evans 1978 made a similar point] This strikes me as begging the question in the Ship case, since we are shoehorning the new ship into either the slot for x or the slot for y, but that was what we couldn’t decide. No rough identity?