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14493
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Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]
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Full Idea:
A higher standard for saying that entities exist might require that they play an essential role in explanation, or must figure in any complete causal story, or exist according to some uniform and nonarbitrary principle of composition.
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From:
Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 11.2)
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A reaction:
I am struck by the first of these three. If I am defending the notion that essence depends on Aristotle's account of explanation, then if we add that existence also depends on explanation, we get a criterion for the existence of essences. Yay.
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21673
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There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
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Full Idea:
Chrysippus says there are two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date', ...but 'Milo will wrestle at Olympia' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent.
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From:
report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 13.30
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A reaction:
We might say that there are atomic and complex facts, but our atomic facts tend to be much simpler, usually just saying some object has some property.
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14491
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Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
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Full Idea:
Where there are analytic interrelations among our claims, distinct ontological claims may be true without rivalry, redundancy, or reduction.
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From:
Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 10)
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A reaction:
Thus we might, I suppose, that it is analytically necessary that a lump of clay has a shape, and that a statue be made of something. Interesting.
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