Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain' and 'Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis'

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7 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence

5992	Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman]
	Full Idea: Chrysippus regarded power to act and be acted upon as the criterion for existence or being - a test satisfied by bodies alone.
	From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Teun L. Tieleman - Chrysippus
	A reaction: This defines existence in terms of causation. Is he ruling out a priori a particle (say) which exists, but never interacts with anything? If so, he is inclining towards anti-realism.

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes

11092	A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine]
	Full Idea: A river is a process through time, and the river stages are its momentary parts. Identification of the river bathed in once with the river bathed in again is just what determines our subject matter to be a river process as opposed to a river stage.
	From: Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 1)
	A reaction: So if we take a thing which has stages, but instead of talking about the stages we talk about a single thing that endures through them, then we are talking about a process. Sounds very good to me.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete

11093	We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine]
	Full Idea: 'Red' is surely not going to be opposed to 'Cayster' [name of a river], as abstract to concrete, merely because of discontinuity in geometrical shape?
	From: Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 2)
	A reaction: I've been slow to grasp the truth of this. However, Quine assumes that 'red' is concrete because 'Cayster' is, but it is perfectly arguable that 'Cayster' is an abstraction, despite all that water.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact

21673	There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
	Full Idea: Chrysippus says there are two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date', ...but 'Milo will wrestle at Olympia' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent.
	From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 13.30
	A reaction: We might say that there are atomic and complex facts, but our atomic facts tend to be much simpler, usually just saying some object has some property.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment

11101	General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine]
	Full Idea: The use of general terms does not commit us to admitting a corresponding abstract entity into our ontology, but an abstract singular term, including the law of putting equals for equals, flatly commits us to an abstract entity named by the term.
	From: Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 4)
	A reaction: Does this mean that in 'for the sake of the children', I have to believe in 'sakes' if I can find a synonym which will substitute for it?

7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories

16652	Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau]
	Full Idea: The Stoics proposed a rather modest categorisation of Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation.
	From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.1

7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism

11096	Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine]
	Full Idea: Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree.
	From: Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 2)
	A reaction: I pick this out because I think it is important. There is a continually shifting domain in any conversation ('what we are talking about'), and speech cannot be understand if the shifting domain or department has not been grasped.