Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Confessio naturae contra atheistas' and 'Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed)'

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3 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus says there are two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date', ...but 'Milo will wrestle at Olympia' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 13.30
     A reaction: We might say that there are atomic and complex facts, but our atomic facts tend to be much simpler, usually just saying some object has some property.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett]
     Full Idea: The dictum that a name has meaning only in the context of a sentence repudiates the conception of a special philosophical sense of 'existence', which claims that numbers do not exist while affirming existential statements about them.
     From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14)
     A reaction: He refers to Frege's Context Principle. Personally I would say you could make plenty of 'affirmations' about arithmetic without them having to be 'existential'. I can say there 'is' a number between 6 and 8, without huge existential claims.
The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett]
     Full Idea: What objects we recognise the world as containing depends upon the structure of our language.
     From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14)
     A reaction: The background to this claim is the Fregean idea that there are no objects for us if there are no concepts. Dummett is adding that there are no concepts if there is no language. I say animals have concepts and recognise objects.