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15268
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Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
On our view, 'event' is to be understood in terms of the ontology of enduring things, while on the Humean view enduring things are conceived to be constructions of events.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV)
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A reaction:
It has quite hard to take either objects or events, given that they seem to be amenable to analysis. I am tempted to take essences as primitive. They fix identity, endure change, bear accidental properties (including temporary intrinsics).
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15319
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Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
There is no metaphysical justification whatever for treating the solid, bounded, material object as the determiner of all thing concepts. Fluids are no less material things than are hard solid blocks.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.IV)
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A reaction:
We don't tend to talk of a fluid as 'a' thing, and without distinct objects there would be virtually no structure, or interest, in nature, so what gives identity to the blocks must interest the metaphysician.
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15318
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Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
The region around a magnetic body, the space between earth and moon, and the vicinity of an electric cable remain obstinately and, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.III)
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A reaction:
Ouch, if you are a strict 'materialist'! I call myself a 'naturalist', in a hand-wavy sort of way. On materialism and determinism I remain vague.
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21673
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There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
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Full Idea:
Chrysippus says there are two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date', ...but 'Milo will wrestle at Olympia' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent.
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From:
report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 13.30
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A reaction:
We might say that there are atomic and complex facts, but our atomic facts tend to be much simpler, usually just saying some object has some property.
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15267
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Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
A state of affairs consists of structures of particulars that endure (of which physical objects would be one type), the properties and powers of those particulars, and the relations obtaining among them. A common 'event' is a change in state of affairs.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV)
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A reaction:
I find 'event' to be so vague, and so dependent on pragmatic interests, that it has hard to find a place for it in an ontological system. Ditto with state of affairs. They overlap. States of affairs can survive change (like a political majority).
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