Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions' and 'Parts of Classes'

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6 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Existence cannot be a matter of degree. If you say there is something that exists to a diminished degree, once you've said 'there is' your game is up.
     From: David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], 3.5)
     A reaction: You might have thought that this was so obvious as to be not worth saying, but as far as I can see it is a minority view in contemporary philosophy. It was Quine's view, and it is mine.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus regarded power to act and be acted upon as the criterion for existence or being - a test satisfied by bodies alone.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Teun L. Tieleman - Chrysippus
     A reaction: This defines existence in terms of causation. Is he ruling out a priori a particle (say) which exists, but never interacts with anything? If so, he is inclining towards anti-realism.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis]
     Full Idea: As yet we have no idea of any third sort of thing that is neither individual nor class nor mixture of the two.
     From: David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], 1.2)
     A reaction: You can see that Lewis was a pupil of Quine. I quote this to show how little impression 'stuff' makes on the modern radar. His defence is that stuff may not be a 'thing', but then he seems to think that 'things' exhaust reality (top p.8 and 9).
Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis]
     Full Idea: A blob can represent atomless gunk: an individual whose parts all have further proper parts.
     From: David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], 1.8)
     A reaction: This is not the same as 'stuff', since gunk is a precise fusion of all those parts, whereas there is no such precision about stuff. Stuff is neutral as to whether it has atoms, or is endlessly divisible. My love of stuff grows. Laycock is a hero.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus says there are two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date', ...but 'Milo will wrestle at Olympia' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 13.30
     A reaction: We might say that there are atomic and complex facts, but our atomic facts tend to be much simpler, usually just saying some object has some property.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: The Stoics proposed a rather modest categorisation of Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.1