display all the ideas for this combination of texts
14 ideas
| 13133 | The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The world is the totality of facts, not of things. The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts. The totality of facts determines what is the case, and what is not the case. ..The world divides into facts. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 1 - 1.2) | |
| A reaction: This is said to be a radical new ontology, because the facts are held to be prior to the things and their properties, which are presumably abstractions from the primitive facts. The modern heir of this is Armstrong's 'states of affairs'. |
| 5992 | Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus regarded power to act and be acted upon as the criterion for existence or being - a test satisfied by bodies alone. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Teun L. Tieleman - Chrysippus | |
| A reaction: This defines existence in terms of causation. Is he ruling out a priori a particle (say) which exists, but never interacts with anything? If so, he is inclining towards anti-realism. |
| 7090 | The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| Full Idea: The 'Tractatus' is an uncompromising, indeed an extreme, example of 'Logical Atomism' | |
| From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921]) by A.C. Grayling - Wittgenstein Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: Russell talked about his 'logical atomism' after 1918, but this reminds us that Wittgenstein was fulfilling a task set for him by Russell. Wittgenstein's atoms are names-plus-objects, Russell's are demonstratives-plus-sensedata. |
| 23464 | In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: In an atomic fact [Sachverhalt] the objects hang one in another, like the links of a chain | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.03), quoted by Homer - The Iliad | |
| A reaction: So the world consists of facts, but the facts are composed of objects. The point seems to be that the truths of language refer to the facts, rather than to the objects. Objects 'don't hang' together in the fact of a chance encounter. |
| 23471 | The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The way in which objects hang together in the atomic fact is the structure of the atomic fact. …The form is the possibility of the structure. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.032-3) | |
| A reaction: I very much like the way LW adds a modal dimension to his ontology. Why doesn't he talk of 'relations', rather than 'hanging together'? |
| 21682 | If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: It is a sign of a proposition's being elementary that there can be no elementary proposition contradicting it. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.211) | |
| A reaction: It is a hallmark of atomic atoms that they have no relations with other atoms, but are wholly independent. This obviously invites the question of how they are united. Are logical connectives intrinsically relational logical atoms? |
| 22319 | Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: It is obvious that in the analysis of propositions we must come to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.221), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 50 'Indep' | |
| A reaction: Not clear about 'combinations of names'. Does that include predicates? How do you combine two names? |
| 21683 | Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: From an elementary proposition no other can be inferred. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.134) | |
| A reaction: Russell was not so sure. This is the sort of remark that elicits from me the question that extravagent metaphysics also provokes - 'how on earth does he know what he claims to be true?'. |
| 23473 | Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M on Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Wittgenstein's writing here is loose, and he seems to be conflating two claims: 1) The totality of existent facts is the world (everything that is the case), and 2) The totality of existent facts determines everything that is the case (the world). | |
| From: comment on Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.04) by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus 1E | |
| A reaction: [Also 2.06 and 2.063] Morris says he must actually mean the second version. |
| 21673 | There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
| Full Idea: Chrysippus says there are two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date', ...but 'Milo will wrestle at Olympia' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 13.30 | |
| A reaction: We might say that there are atomic and complex facts, but our atomic facts tend to be much simpler, usually just saying some object has some property. |
| 22311 | The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 1.11), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 47 'Mole' | |
| A reaction: He is denying negative facts (also written to Russell in 1919). Best approached through truthmakers, I suspect. There is no truthmaker for the supposed factual claim 'there are birds on Mars' - so it is a fact that there are no birds on Mars. |
| 22313 | The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The existence of atomic facts we also call a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact. b...The existence and non-existence of atomic facts is the reality. ...[2.063] the total reality is the world. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.06), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 47 'Mole' | |
| A reaction: Potter observes that he denies negative facts in a1919 letter to Russell, and at 1.11, but then affirms them at 2.06. |
| 22314 | On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: On white paper, the fact that a point is black corresponds to a positive fact; to the fact that a point is white (not black), a negative fact. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.063), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 08 'Judg' | |
| A reaction: Elsewhere Wittgenstein is ambiguous as to whether he believes in negative facts [qv]. |
| 16652 | Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: The Stoics proposed a rather modest categorisation of Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation. | |
| From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.1 |