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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason' and 'Mere Possibilities'

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6 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers deny there could have been anything other than what in fact exists, or that anything that exists could have failed to exist. This is developed in very different ways by Wittgenstein (in 'Tractatus'), Lewis and Williamson.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Mere Possibilities [2012], 1)
     A reaction: This could come in various strengths. A weak version would say that, empirically, that all talk of what doesn't exist is vacuous. A strong necessity (Williamson?) that totally rules out other possible existence is a very odd view.
A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: A nominalist definition of existence is 'having spatio-temporal location'.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Mere Possibilities [2012], 1.1)
     A reaction: This would evidently be physicalist as well as nominalist. Presumably it fits the 'mosaic' of reality Lewis refers to. I find this view sympathetic. A process of abstraction is required to get the rest of the stuff we talk about.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus regarded power to act and be acted upon as the criterion for existence or being - a test satisfied by bodies alone.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Teun L. Tieleman - Chrysippus
     A reaction: This defines existence in terms of causation. Is he ruling out a priori a particle (say) which exists, but never interacts with anything? If so, he is inclining towards anti-realism.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Leibnizian monads qualify as Kantian noumena [Gardner]
     Full Idea: Leibnizian monads clearly satisfy Kant's definition of noumena.
     From: Sebastian Gardner (Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason [1999], 06 'Noumena')
     A reaction: This needs qualifying, because Leibniz clearly specifies the main attributes of monads, where Kant is adamant that we can saying virtually nothing about noumena.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus says there are two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date', ...but 'Milo will wrestle at Olympia' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 13.30
     A reaction: We might say that there are atomic and complex facts, but our atomic facts tend to be much simpler, usually just saying some object has some property.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: The Stoics proposed a rather modest categorisation of Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.1