display all the ideas for this combination of texts
20 ideas
5992 | Chrysippus says action is the criterion for existence, which must be physical [Chrysippus, by Tieleman] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus regarded power to act and be acted upon as the criterion for existence or being - a test satisfied by bodies alone. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Teun L. Tieleman - Chrysippus | |
A reaction: This defines existence in terms of causation. Is he ruling out a priori a particle (say) which exists, but never interacts with anything? If so, he is inclining towards anti-realism. |
12838 | Four-dimensional ontology has no change, since that needs an object, and time to pass [Simons] |
Full Idea: In the four-dimensional ontology there may be timeless variation, but there is no change. Change consists in an object having first one property and then another contrary one. But processes all have their properties timelessly. | |
From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 3.4) | |
A reaction: Possibly Simons is begging the question here. The phenomena which are traditionally labelled as 'change' are all nicely covered in the four-D account. Change is, we might say, subsumed in the shape of the space-time 'worm'. |
12842 | There are real relational changes, as well as bogus 'Cambridge changes' [Simons] |
Full Idea: It is a mistake to call bogus Cambridge changes 'relational changes', since there are real relational changes, such as the changes in the relative positions and distances of several bodies. | |
From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 4.1) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure how you distinguish the two. If we swap seats, that is a real change. If everyone moves away from where I am sitting, is that real or Cambridge? If I notice, I might be upset, but suppose I don't notice? Nothing about me changes. |
12841 | I don't believe in processes [Simons] |
Full Idea: I have been unable to see that there are processes. | |
From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 4.1 n4) | |
A reaction: My problem here is that I am inclined to think of the mind as a process of the brain. The fact that a reductive account can be given of a process doesn't mean that we can deny there existence. Is there no such thing as decay, or erosion? |
12836 | Fans of process ontology cheat, since river-stages refer to 'rivers' [Simons] |
Full Idea: Proponents of process ontology (except perhaps Whitehead, who is obscure) indulge in double-talk with concrete examples. It is cheating to talk of 'cat-processes', or 'bathing in river-stages'. You can't change the subject and leave the predicate alone. | |
From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 3.4) | |
A reaction: It is one thing to admit processes into one's ontology, and another to have a 'process ontology', which presumably reduces objects to processes. I suppose the interest of continuant objects is precisely the aspect of them that is above any process. |
12880 | Moments are things like smiles or skids, which are founded on other things [Simons] |
Full Idea: A 'moment' is something which is founded on something else. Examples are legion: smiles, headaches, gestures, skids, collisions, fights, thought, all founded on their participants, the continuants involved in them. | |
From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 8.4) | |
A reaction: The idea of a 'moment' and 'foundation' come from Husserl Log. Inv. 3. Simons says moments 'have a bright future in ontology'. It would be better if fewer of his examples involved human beings and their perceptions. |
12883 | Moving disturbances are are moments which continuously change their basis [Simons] |
Full Idea: Moving disturbances are a special and interesting kind of continuant: moments which continuously change their fundaments. | |
From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 8.5) | |
A reaction: [a smile is a moment, and the face its fundament] I'm thinking he's got this wrong. Compare Idea 12882. Disturbances can't be continuants, because the passing of time is essential to them, but not to a continuant. |
12881 | A smiling is an event with causes, but the smile is a continuant without causes [Simons] |
Full Idea: A smiling, being an event, has causes and effects, whereas the smile thereby produced is a continuant, and has itself neither causes nor effects. | |
From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 8.5) | |
A reaction: This is dogmatic, hopeful and a bit dubious. Simons is very scathing about processes in ontology. There seem to be two descriptions, with distinctive syntax, but it is hard to believe that in reality we have two types of thing present. |
12882 | A wave is maintained by a process, but it isn't a process [Simons] |
Full Idea: A wave is maintained by a process transferring motion from particle to particle of the medium, but it is not identical with this process. | |
From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 8.5) | |
A reaction: I'm inclined to think of the mind as a process. There are some 'things' which only seem to exist if they have a duration. Bricks can be instantaneous, but minds and waves can't. A wave isn't a continuant. A hill isn't a wave. |
12840 | I do not think there is a general identity condition for events [Simons] |
Full Idea: Like Anscombe (1979) I do not think there is such a creature as a general identity condition for events. | |
From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 4.1 n1) | |
A reaction: My working definition of an event is 'any part of a process which can be individuated'. This leaves you trying to define a process, and define individuate, and then to realise that individuation is not an objective matter. |
12839 | Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams [Simons] |
Full Idea: A closer examination of the concepts and principles of relativity shows that they rest squarely on an ontology of things and events (not on convenient 'space-time diagrams'). Acceleration concerns non-zero mass, but only continuants can have a mass. | |
From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 3.4) | |
A reaction: The point here is that fans of four-dimensionalism like to claim that they are more in touch with modern physics, because 'time is just another dimension, like space, so objects are spread across it'. Simons sounds right about this. |
16345 | That Peano arithmetic is interpretable in ZF set theory is taken by philosophers as a reduction [Halbach] |
Full Idea: The observation that Peano arithmetic is relatively interpretable in ZF set theory is taken by many philosophers to be a reduction of numbers to sets. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 23) | |
A reaction: Nice! Being able to express something in a different language is not the same as a reduction. Back to the drawing board. What do you really mean by a reduction? If we model something, we don't 'reduce' it to the model. |
12879 | Independent objects can exist apart, and maybe even entirely alone [Simons] |
Full Idea: An object a is ontologically independent of b if a can exist without b, if there is a possible world in which in which a exists and b does not. In the strongest sense, an object is independent if it could be all there is. | |
From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 8.4) | |
A reaction: Simons calls the strongest version a 'startling' one which maybe not even God could achieve. |
12847 | Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons] |
Full Idea: Syntactic criteria for mass nouns include that they admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. | |
From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 4.6) | |
A reaction: That is, they don't seem to be countable. Sortal terms are those which pick out countables. |
12863 | Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons] |
Full Idea: Mass terms and plural terms differ principally in the indifference of mass terms to matters of division. A mass term can be used irrespective of how, indeed whether, the denotatum comes parcelled in units. | |
From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 6.4) | |
A reaction: It seems more to the point to say that mass terms (stuff) don't need units to exist, and you can disperse the units (the cups of water) without affecting the identity of the stuff. You can't pulverise a pile of stones and retain the stones. |
12862 | Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons] |
Full Idea: The mass of gold cannot be identified with the gold atoms, because whatever is part of the gold atoms is gold, whereas not every part of the gold is gold (for example, the neutrons in it are not gold). | |
From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 6.4) | |
A reaction: There is something too quick about arguments like this. It comes back to nominal v real essence. We apply 'gold' to the superficial features of the stuff, but deep down we may actually mean the atomic structure. See Idea 12812. |
12858 | Mixtures disappear if nearly all of the mixture is one ingredient [Simons] |
Full Idea: If a cupful of dirty water is mixed evenly with a ton of earth, no dirty water remains, and the same goes if we mix it evenly with a lake of clean water. | |
From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 6.2) | |
A reaction: This means that a mixture is a vague entity, subject to the sorites paradox. If the dirt was cyanide, we would consider the water to be polluted by it down to a much lower level. |
12859 | A mixture can have different qualities from its ingredients. [Simons] |
Full Idea: The qualities of a mixture need not be those of its ingredients in isolation. | |
From: Peter Simons (Parts [1987], 6.2) | |
A reaction: It depends on what you mean by a quality. Presumably we can give a reductive account of the qualities of the mixture, as long as no reaction has taken place. The taste of a salad is just the sum of its parts. |
21673 | There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero] |
Full Idea: Chrysippus says there are two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date', ...but 'Milo will wrestle at Olympia' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 13.30 | |
A reaction: We might say that there are atomic and complex facts, but our atomic facts tend to be much simpler, usually just saying some object has some property. |
16652 | Stoics categories are Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation [Chrysippus, by Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The Stoics proposed a rather modest categorisation of Substrate, Quality, Disposition, and Relation. | |
From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.1 |