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2 ideas
9869 | Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Fully fledged realism depends on - indeed, may be identified with - an undiluted application to sentences of the relevant kind of straightforwards two-valued semantics. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: This is the sort of account you get from a whole-heartedly linguistic philosopher. Personally I would say that Dummett has got it precisely the wrong way round: I adopt a two-valued semantics because my metaphysics is realist. |
13877 | Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: When a class of terms functions as singular terms, and the sentences are true, then those terms genuinely refer. Being singular terms, their reference is to objects. There is no further question whether they really refer, and there are such objects. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.iii) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a key sentence, because this whole view is standardly called 'platonic', but it certainly isn't platonism as we know it, Jim. Ontology has become an entirely linguistic matter, but do we then have 'sakes' and 'whereaboutses'? |