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2 ideas
11101 | General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine] |
Full Idea: The use of general terms does not commit us to admitting a corresponding abstract entity into our ontology, but an abstract singular term, including the law of putting equals for equals, flatly commits us to an abstract entity named by the term. | |
From: Willard Quine (Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis [1950], 4) | |
A reaction: Does this mean that in 'for the sake of the children', I have to believe in 'sakes' if I can find a synonym which will substitute for it? |
13877 | Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C] |
Full Idea: When a class of terms functions as singular terms, and the sentences are true, then those terms genuinely refer. Being singular terms, their reference is to objects. There is no further question whether they really refer, and there are such objects. | |
From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.iii) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a key sentence, because this whole view is standardly called 'platonic', but it certainly isn't platonism as we know it, Jim. Ontology has become an entirely linguistic matter, but do we then have 'sakes' and 'whereaboutses'? |