Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Introduction to 'Properties'', 'Exigency to Exist in Essences' and 'The Principles of Human Knowledge'

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3 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: We have, I think, shown the impossibility of Abstract Ideas.
     From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §21)
     A reaction: He achieves this by an attack on universals, offering the nominalist view that there are only particulars. There seems to be a middle ground, where universals don't actually exist, but there are settled conventional abstraction, beyond particulars.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: From the conflict of all the possibles demanding existence, this at once follows, that there exists that series of things by which as many of them as possible exist.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.91)
     A reaction: I'm in tune with a lot of Leibniz, but my head swims with this one. He seems to be a Lewisian about possible worlds - that they are concrete existing entities (with appetites!). Could Lewis include Leibniz's idea in his system?
God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The sufficient reason for God's choice can be found only in the fitness (convenance) or in the degree of perfection that the several worlds possess.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Exigency to Exist in Essences [1690], p.92)
     A reaction: The 'fitness' of a world and its 'perfection' seem very different things. A piece of a jigsaw can have wonderful fitness, without perfection. Occasionally you get that sinking feeling with metaphysicians that they just make it up.