Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Potentiality' and 'Apriority and Existence'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts [Vetter]
     Full Idea: We can think of the world as a 'whole' that has everything as its parts, like raisins in a cake, or we can think of the world as a 'container', which is disjoint from everything there is, like a bottle containing water.
     From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.3)
     A reaction: [compressed] Space and time seem to have a special role here, and it is hard to think of any other candidates for being the 'container'. I think I will apply my 'what's it made of' test to ontology, and opt for the world as a 'whole'.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational') [Vetter]
     Full Idea: 'Relational' grounding is between entities, best expressed by the two-place predicate 'x grounds y'. 'Operational' grounding is between sentences, best expressed by the two-place sentence operator read as 'because of' or 'in virtue of'.
     From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.6)
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality [Vetter]
     Full Idea: Humean supervenience excludes modality - the whole modal package - from the supervenience base. The Humean world is, at root, thoroughly non-modal.
     From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.2)
     A reaction: This sums up my problem with David Lewis with perfect clarity. He is just excessively empirical. Hume himself also excluded modality from the basic impressions. Locke allows powerful essences (even if they are well hidden).
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
We quantify over events, worlds, etc. in order to make logical possibilities clearer [Yablo]
     Full Idea: It is not that the contents of sentences are inexpressible without quantifying over events, worlds, etc. (they aren't). But the logical relations become much more tractable if we represent them quantificationally.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Apriority and Existence [2000], §13)
     A reaction: Yablo is explaining why we find ourselves committed to abstract objects. It is essentially, as I am beginning to suspect, a conspiracy of logicians. What on earth is 'the empty set' when it is at home? What's it made of?