display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 19015 | Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational') [Vetter] |
| Full Idea: 'Relational' grounding is between entities, best expressed by the two-place predicate 'x grounds y'. 'Operational' grounding is between sentences, best expressed by the two-place sentence operator read as 'because of' or 'in virtue of'. | |
| From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.6) |
| 18539 | Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction [Heil] |
| Full Idea: Categories we use to describe and explain our universe do not line up in the neat way reductive schemes require. | |
| From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 13.2) | |
| A reaction: He takes reduction to be largely a relation between our categories, rather than between entities, so he is bound to get this result. He may be right. |
| 19012 | The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality [Vetter] |
| Full Idea: Humean supervenience excludes modality - the whole modal package - from the supervenience base. The Humean world is, at root, thoroughly non-modal. | |
| From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: This sums up my problem with David Lewis with perfect clarity. He is just excessively empirical. Hume himself also excluded modality from the basic impressions. Locke allows powerful essences (even if they are well hidden). |