Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance', 'Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed)' and 'Reality without Reference'

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9 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence

8910	General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas [Locke]
	Full Idea: It is plain that general and universal belong not to the real existence of things; but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas.
	From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.03.11)
	A reaction: Frege and Geach viciously attacked this view, and it seems to be discredited, but I think it is time for a revival, given that the alternative view seems to lead to platonism. I take the first step in mental abstractionism to be pre-verbal.

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence

12554	Existences can only be known by experience [Locke]
	Full Idea: The existence of things is to be known only from experience.
	From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.03.31)
	A reaction: This is the clearest statement you could wish for of the standard empiricist view of such things. Locke might take a broad view of experience, since he unshakably infers the existence of God from merely thinking about being.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms

12502	Comparisons boil down to simple elements of sensation or reflection [Locke]
	Full Idea: All comparisons terminate in, and are concerned about those simple ideas, either of sensation or reflection; which I think to be the whole material of all our knowledge.
	From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.25.09)
	A reaction: This seems to be an ancestor of logical atomism. Hume is inclined to make his 'atoms' strictly empirical (as 'impressions'), but Locke also allows simples of reflection, which may be a priori conceptual atoms.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism

12568	God assures me of the existence of external things [Locke]
	Full Idea: God has given me assurance enough of the existence of things without me.
	From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.11.03)
	A reaction: Is Locke committing a similar crime to Descartes? Descartes was circular about what is 'clear and distinct'. Locke uses inner existence to prove God, who is then rich enough at act as guarantor for what is external. Not circular. Over-reaching.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance

12516	Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke]
	Full Idea: The cause of obscurity in simple ideas seems to be either dull organs, or very slight and transient impressions made by the objects, or else a weakness in memory, not able to retain them as received.
	From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.29.03)
	A reaction: This seems to give some support to the epistemological view of vagueness, with the implication that if our senses and memory were perfect, then our ideas would have perfect clarity.

12517	Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke]
	Full Idea: A source of confusion is when any complex idea is made up of too small a number of simple ideas, and such only as are common to other things, whereby the differences that make it deserve a different name are left out.
	From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.29.07)
	A reaction: In other words, a word covers a variety of entities, and so it cannot possibly pinpoint any of them exactly. Cats all differ, but so do small and large circles.

7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation

13435	We can't categorise things by their real essences, because these are unknown [Locke]
	Full Idea: Nor indeed can we rank and sort things, and consequently (which is the end of sorting) denominate them by their real essences, because we know them not.
	From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.09)
	A reaction: Hence he says we categorise by the nominal essence, which is the ideas we have formed from our experiences of things. If we now have experts who have mastered some real essences, Locke is wrong, if we submit to the expert categories.

12535	If we discovered real essences, we would still categorise things by the external appearance [Locke]
	Full Idea: Supposing that the real essences were discoverable, ..yet we could not reasonably think that the ranking of things under general names was regulated by those internal real constitutions, or any thing else but their obvious appearance.
	From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.25)
	A reaction: This makes Putnam's water and twater the same! I take it there is no rule here. The authority of science has gradually substitute H2O as the criterion for water, so real essence rules, but it doesn't have to.

7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism

13436	There are no gaps in the continuum of nature, and everything has something closely resembling it [Locke]
	Full Idea: In the visible corporeal world we see no chasms or gaps. All quite down from us the descent is by easy steps and a continued series of things, that in each remove differ very little from the other. There are fish that have wings, and birds inhabit water.
	From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.12)
	A reaction: This is a direct contradiction of Plato's claim that nature has joints (Idea 7953). Locke's claim doesn't sound very plausible for many cases, and the examples he gives are far from conclusive.