display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
3990 | The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis] |
Full Idea: The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.412) | |
A reaction: This seems to me the central truth about brains, and we should not be lured into abandoning it. We should not, however, exclude the possibility that there is a non-physical reality. |
3991 | Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis] |
Full Idea: In the case of millions of pixels making up a picture on a computer screen, the supervenience is reduction. | |
From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.414) | |
A reaction: Since 'supervenience' seems a suspect relationship about which no one is clear, this is a point very much worth making. |
14334 | Modest realism says there is a reality; the presumptuous view says we can accurately describe it [Mumford] |
Full Idea: The claim of modest realism is that there is a subject-independent reality; the presumptuous claim is that we are capable of describing that reality accurately. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 09.1) | |
A reaction: And the super-presumptuous claim is that there only exists one ultimate accurate description of reality. I am happy to call myself a Modest Realist on this one. |
14306 | Anti-realists deny truth-values to all statements, and say evidence and ontology are inseparable [Mumford] |
Full Idea: The anti-realist declines to permit that all statements have truth-values. ...The essence of the anti-realist position is that evidence and ontology cannot be separated. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 03.6) | |
A reaction: [second half on p.51] The idea that evidence and ontology are 'inseparable' strikes me as an absurd idea. The proposal that you should not speculate about ontology without some sort of evidence is, of course, not unreasonable. |