display all the ideas for this combination of texts
12 ideas
| 21812 | Being is the product of pure intellect [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: Intellectual-Principle [Nous] by its intellective act establishes Being. | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.04) | |
| A reaction: This is a surprising view - that there is something which is prior to Being - but I take it to be Plotinus giving primacy to Plato's Form of the Good (a pure ideal), ahead of the One of Parmenides (which is Being). |
| 21817 | The One does not exist, but is the source of all existence [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: The First is no member of existence, but can be the source of all. | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.07) | |
| A reaction: The First is the One, and this explicitly denies that it has Being. This answers the self-predication problem of Forms. Plato thought the Form of the Beautiful was beautiful, but it can't be (because of the regress). The source of existence can't exist. |
| 21824 | The One is a principle which transcends Being [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: There exists a principle which transcends Being; this the One. | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.10) | |
| A reaction: The idea that the One transcends Being is the distinctive Plotinus doctrine. He defends the view that this was also the view of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato. |
| 21813 | Number determines individual being [Plotinus] |
| Full Idea: Number is the determinant of individual being. | |
| From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.05) | |
| A reaction: You might have thought that number was the consequence of the individualities (or units) within being, but not so. You can't get more platonic than saying that the idealised numbers are the source of the particular units. |
| 4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Nominalists tend to deny the existence of abstract objects since, given their purported nature (non-causal), we can have no reason to believe in their existence. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.372) | |
| A reaction: A good point. Aristotle worried about the causal inadequacy of the Forms. My mind can conceive of a 'thing' with no causal powers, just sitting there. |
| 4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: There seem to be three kinds of change: compositional change (of component parts), qualitative change (of properties), or substantial change (when underlying essence begins or ceases). | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.59) | |
| A reaction: Notice this gives 'components' a more prominent ontological status than usual. Is this computer a component of my study? |
| 4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Qualitative change is seen as either (i) 'Presentism' - 'a is F now', or (ii) 'relational properties' - 'a is F-at-t', or (iii) 'temporal parts' - 'a-at-t is F', or (iv) 'adverbial' - 'a is-a-t F'. | |
| From: report of E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.44) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: The traditional view would let a stay the same over time, and change its property (ii). Lewis favours (iii). My suspicion is that thinking collapses if you abandon the tradtional view. |
| 4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can plausible coincide in space and time. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.225) | |
| A reaction: This is certainly discouraging for anyone who wanted to make events ontologically basic. Physicalist need to be able to individuate events in a reductive way. |
| 4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: It is sometimes said that modern physics requires us to espouse an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.233) | |
| A reaction: It has to be a mistake to build our philosophical ontology on current physics, because even the physicists say they don't understand the latter very well. |
| 4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.229) | |
| A reaction: What exactly would 'exemplify' mean here? This probably turns out to be circular when you attempt to explain what a property is. |
| 4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: My own preference is for a conception of events which reduces them to changes in the properties of or relations between things. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.245) | |
| A reaction: Changes of property and changes of relations are two very different things. Is a 'near miss' an event? If so, is any movement an event? If movement is relative, then so are events. |
| 4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Some metaphysicians think the fundamental categories of existence are universals and particulars, while other prefer the division between abstract and concrete. | |
| From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.15) | |
| A reaction: Interestingly, in trying to choose between these, it is tempting to think about the capacities of the brain. Which is the cart and which is the horse? |