Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Powers', 'Lewis on Perdurance versus Endurance' and 'The Evolution of Logic'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
15541 Maybe particles are unchanging, and intrinsic change in things is their rearrangement [Lowe, by Lewis]
     Full Idea: Lowe's solution the 'temporary intrinsics' problem is that particles have no temporary intrinsic properties; they may be safely supposed to endure, and large things consist of those enduring particles, undergoing rearrangement but no intrinsic change.
     From: report of E.J. Lowe (Lewis on Perdurance versus Endurance [1987]) by David Lewis - Rearrangement of Particles II
     A reaction: A mere rearrangement of particles doesn't sound the same as a change in properties, which must involve causal powers in some way.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
11919 Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar]
     Full Idea: Ontological dependence is better understood in terms of an essential connection, rather than simply a necessary connection.
     From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.4.4)
     A reaction: This seems to be an important piece in the essentialist jigsaw. Apart from essentialism, I can't think of any doctrine which offers any sort of explanation of the self-evident fact of certain ontological dependencies.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
13488 Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD]
     Full Idea: Jespersen calls a noun a mass word when it has no plural, does not take numerical adjectives, and does not take 'fewer'.
     From: William D. Hart (The Evolution of Logic [2010], 3)
     A reaction: Jespersen was a great linguistics expert.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
11929 The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar]
     Full Idea: The ontologically fundamental categories are three in number: Objects, Properties, and Relations.
     From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 2 Intr)
     A reaction: We need second-order logic to quantify over all of these. The challenge to this view might be that it is static, and needs the addition of processes or events. Molnar rejects facts and states of affairs.