8910
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General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas [Locke]
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Full Idea:
It is plain that general and universal belong not to the real existence of things; but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.03.11)
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A reaction:
Frege and Geach viciously attacked this view, and it seems to be discredited, but I think it is time for a revival, given that the alternative view seems to lead to platonism. I take the first step in mental abstractionism to be pre-verbal.
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12516
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Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke]
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Full Idea:
The cause of obscurity in simple ideas seems to be either dull organs, or very slight and transient impressions made by the objects, or else a weakness in memory, not able to retain them as received.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.29.03)
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A reaction:
This seems to give some support to the epistemological view of vagueness, with the implication that if our senses and memory were perfect, then our ideas would have perfect clarity.
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12517
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Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke]
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Full Idea:
A source of confusion is when any complex idea is made up of too small a number of simple ideas, and such only as are common to other things, whereby the differences that make it deserve a different name are left out.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.29.07)
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A reaction:
In other words, a word covers a variety of entities, and so it cannot possibly pinpoint any of them exactly. Cats all differ, but so do small and large circles.
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13435
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We can't categorise things by their real essences, because these are unknown [Locke]
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Full Idea:
Nor indeed can we rank and sort things, and consequently (which is the end of sorting) denominate them by their real essences, because we know them not.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.09)
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A reaction:
Hence he says we categorise by the nominal essence, which is the ideas we have formed from our experiences of things. If we now have experts who have mastered some real essences, Locke is wrong, if we submit to the expert categories.
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12535
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If we discovered real essences, we would still categorise things by the external appearance [Locke]
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Full Idea:
Supposing that the real essences were discoverable, ..yet we could not reasonably think that the ranking of things under general names was regulated by those internal real constitutions, or any thing else but their obvious appearance.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.06.25)
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A reaction:
This makes Putnam's water and twater the same! I take it there is no rule here. The authority of science has gradually substitute H2O as the criterion for water, so real essence rules, but it doesn't have to.
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